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3Abstract:
To recent critical formulations regarding melancholy and its role in the 
Renaissance humoral body, this project contributes the argument that melancholy’s 
trajectory from its natural to its unnatural state carries with it a fundamental shift in 
temporal-senses. I illustrate this shift through close analysis of Leontes derangement in 
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale. Based on Renaissance physiological texts, as well as 
modem psychoanalytic, anthropological, and gender studies, I explore how melancholy s 
inherent volatility signifies the masculine anxieties of early modem English patriarchy. I 
argue that melancholy’s bifurcated temporal-senses serve to clarify the subjectivity of 
Renaissance passions.
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Introduction:
“Time travels in divers paces with divers persons.”—Rosalind, As You Like It
Much of the criticism of The Winter’s Tale has traced the trajectory of Leontes’ 
derangement as roughly analogous to Othello’s. Harold Bloom, for example, describes 
The Winter's Tale as the story of Leontes, the “Othello who is his own Iago”
Invention o f  the Human 639). What distinguishes the two pathologies, and indeed the 
two plays, is the issue of time. While the similarities between the two characters may be 
evident, what I will be arguing here is that a distinguishing feature between these two 
pathologies and indeed of the plays themselves is their treatments of time. In The 
Winter’s Tale, Leontes’ affective state issues fully formed from within his mind; explicit 
cause is left absent. But the cause of Leontes’ pathological jealousy, as I will argue, has 
its root in temporal processes, and springs ultimately from a temporal deficit associated 
with melancholy in two of its forms: first, through overt dominance by the melancholy 
humor, which Elizabethans and Jacobeans understood to be a chemical cause with 
specific temporal ramifications; and, second, through the melancholia interpreted through 
psychoanalytic analysis of the narcissistic structuring Shakespeare patterns in this play 
off Ovid’s tale of “Narcissus” in his Metamorphoses.
In the two plays in which he treats the issue of jealousy in a tragic framework,
The Winter ’sTale and Othello, Shakespeare portrays leading characters of inherently 
melancholic temperaments, whose melancholy is manifested both dramatically on the 
stage as well as by each character’s respective narration of his condition. Through
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processes integral to the early modem understanding of the humoral body, however, 
Leontes and Othello's periods of melancholy develop into periods of applied and 
sustained jealousy. The trajectory of these passions adheres to contemporaneous 
Elizabethan and Jacobean physiological texts with remarkable correspondences. These 
correspondences suggest that when he chose to write of these powerful passions, 
Shakespeare wrote in a manner that his early modem audience could readily understand, 
with specific and itemized cultural constructions regarding what Mark Breitenberg has 
identified as the masculine anxieties of the period.
My critical approach derives from and builds upon perspectives developed by 
commentators on the early modem humoral body, including Gail Kem Paster, Mark 
Breitenberg, and Juliana Schiesari. Their work clarifies study begun by Michele Foucault 
and M.M Bakhtin regarding the historical and literary construction and regulation of the 
body. Both theorists are interested specifically in the relationship between the body 
within the personal sphere and the body politic, within the political. Because the early 
modem formulation of the humoral body drew hierarchical parallels between the body 
and the body politic, and because nowhere does the application of the political more 
concretely find expression than in the expression of gender, I will utilize the work of 
Paster, Breitenberg and Schiesari to the extent that they clarify this conjunction. I will 
focus, however, on contemporary Elizabethan and Jacobean medical writers for the light 
they cast on the melancholy humor: notably, Stephen Batman, Timothy Bright, and 
Robert Burton. I suggest that their physiological treatises provide both a vocabulary and 
a diagnostic, performative schema to which the Renaissance audience was attuned, and,
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furthermore, that Leontes’ derangement in The Winter’s Tale serves as a vertitable 
playing-out of these medically prescriptive actions and words to which the early modem 
ear was accustomed.
In his pioneering study, The Rise o f the Novel, Ian Watt grounds the formation of 
realistic characterization on Locke’s insistence that the formation of character must hinge 
fundamentally on that character’s understanding of his or her own temporality, or 
existence of being in time. Watt cites Locke’s definition of personal identity as “an 
identity of consciousness through duration in time,” where this “individual [exists] in 
touch with his own continuing identity through memory of his past thoughts and actions” 
(Watt 21). Watt argues that ancient, Medieval and Renaissance portrayal of individual 
character in various genres relies almost exclusively on the continual re-hashing of 
“timeless universals” which pale when compared with the novel’s ability to portray life 
with any viable verisimilitude. Indeed, Watt suggests that the great bulk of literature 
p r e v io u s  to the novel’s eighteenth-century provenance avoids grappling with what he 
calls “temporal flux” (23); instead, it deals exclusively with time as a type, in existence 
solely to illustrate the “supremely timeless fact of death” (23). This understanding, he 
urges, works toward highlighting the fundamentally ahistoric nature of these works that 
serve as precedent to the novel. Such essentially atemporal grounding represents 
effectively, Watt insists, the “very minor importance accorded to the temporal dimension 
in most literature previous to the novel” (23).
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In The Renaissance Discovery o f Time, on the other hand, Ricardo J. Quinones 
highlights the very different conceptions toward time of the people of the Medieval 
period from those of the Renaissance. Quinones explores how the poets of these periods 
express these differing conceptions in their art. At its root, Quinones notes that for the 
people of the Middle Ages, time was “abundant” (7) in the sense that through an over­
riding religious faith, one could live in “an attitude of temporal ease. Neither time nor 
change [would] appear to be critical, and hence there [would be] no great worry about 
controlling the future” (7). Time in this conception unfolded as a marked unfolding of 
God’s Providence, which David Scott Kastan, for instance, illustrates bears direct 
comparison with the portrait of time we encounter in the Corpus Christi plays of the 
period (4-5). Quinones refers to Alfred von Martin’s telling explanation of the differing 
Medieval and Renaissance temporal sense in his description of construction:
In the Middle Ages it was possible to spend tens and even thousands of 
years on the completion of one building . . .  for life was the life of the 
community in which one generation quietly succeeds to another. . . .  
[Whereas in the Renaissance] time was always short and hence valuable ..
. .  [Time became precious] only when regarded from the point of view of 
the individual who could think in terms of the time measured out to him.
It was scarce simply on account of natural limitations, and so everything 
from now on had to move quickly. For example, it became necessary to 
build quickly, as the patron was now building for himself. ( o f
the Renaissance 16)
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Quinones acknowledges the increasingly economic aspect of time as an explicit 
commodity, but he urges that this understanding should not cloud us to the essentially 
psychological shift at work in the writers of this period. In other words, the builders’ 
construction on the land has a commensurate temporal approximation regarding the 
poetic constructors of the age.
Indeed, it is these writers’ heightened portrayal of the temporal as signifying a 
dilemma within the individual that Quinones argues serves ultimately to undermine the 
Medieval temporal sense. The more the individual could represent through his or her 
own individuality or personhood a desire to act and not “to let things be, to rely with 
patient trust in a providential Creator” (Quinones 8), the more we move into this utterly 
differing temporal sense. Toward this end, Quinones suggests that the creation of 
characters such as Dr. Faustus, Richard III, and Macbeth illustrates this point, for within 
each of these tragic characters the “diabolic is impaled on its own boundless desire” (8). 
Quinones argues that this desire derives directly from the altered conception of 
temporality in the Renaissance, and as such he forces a substantially more careful 
reevaluation of the terminus a quo of artistically represented individuality, of the discrete, 
individuated personal identity as delineated by the individual’s underlying temporal 
sense.
The dismantling of the Aristotelian dramatic Unities consumed Shakespeare from 
the very outset of his career. Though he expresses a conception of time, or an attitude 
toward it, which admittedly exists in the form that Watt suggests, notably in The Winter’s 
Tale itself, where Time himself walks on with his hourglass, Shakespeare’s dramatic
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expression is nearly always one of subversion. For example, Time as Chorus in The 
Winter ’sTale walks on stage per Watt’s Medieval formulation, but then proceeds to 
“o’erthrow law” and “o ’erwhelm custom” (4.1.8-9)1 and to leap ahead sixteen years. If 
time in the Medieval period served simply as the unfolding of God’s Providence, Kastan 
suggests, then with the Renaissance human interpretation takes on more radical 
interpretations of time (5-6). Kastan calls the artistic attempts to make sense of this shift 
in temporal understanding “Renaissance explorations of time” (6), and Shakespeare, he 
argues, illustrates “with unparalleled energy and originality ways in which dramatic 
structure are intimately connected with differing conceptions of the human experience in 
and of time” (6-7). In other words, as if once beyond the comforting yet claustrophobic 
pale of the Medieval time sense, in which God’s providence and will unfold ineluctably, 
“Shakespeare answers time’s insistent call with the complex grammar of forms (7) that 
Kastan identifies in his book.
Shakespeares’ Sonnets admittedly run rife with discussion of and railing against 
the effects of time on earth, treating time as Time, as that Medieval type. Time exists as 
the great devourer (as Ovid’s Tempus Edax Rerum) that ultimately “seals up all in rest 
(Sonnet 73), and works here as a menacing agent seeking exclusively to demolish and to 
batter through mutability and death both Nature and the works of man, as in Sonnet 12. 
“And nothing ‘gainst Time’s scythe can make defense/ Save breed, to brave him when he 
takes thee hence.” Shakespeare also writes of this aspect of time s character in seasonal
' All references to the work o f William Shakespeare refer to The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore 
Evans, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
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terms: “For never-resting time leads summer on/ To hideous winter and confounds him 
there” (Sonnet 5); “Then let not winter’s ragged hand deface/ In thee thy summer ere 
thou be distill’d”(Sonnet 6). But G.F. Waller notes that in the Sonnets “Particularly 
revealing is the context into which [Shakespeare’s] treatment of time is put: it is set 
almost exclusively within the context of individual mortality” (89). While this concern 
for the effects of Time in the sublunary world manifests itself as to some degree the 
keynote of the seventeenth century, even into a veritable preoccupation with its effects, it 
is Shakespeare’s innovation to stress the impact of time on the individuality, as it were, of 
the individual. If individuality, as Watt would have it, is to be defined by temporality, 
not simply in reference to artistic endeavor, but as a matter of course, then Shakespeare s 
portrayal of the individual in these terms becomes significant in explicating the genesis of 
the individuality of this artistically created individual. Contrary to Watt’s formulation, 
but utilizing his terms, Shakespeare does indeed yield us “a sense of personal identity 
subsisting through duration and yet being changed by the flow of experience” (24). 
Shakespeare’s portrayal of characters made to act and react in worlds where the time is 
out of joint appears to enforce identity: the character becomes our touchstone in a world 
gone temporally wrong. In Hamlet, Othello, Lear and The Winter's Tale, the characters 
are also traumatized by time, by their own temporality, and perhaps this point is the 
simple reason why the characters are so resonant with us today.
Shakespeare strives to push forward a subtle concept, that time may work in any 
number of intriguing ways. It may work plainly and painfully as a devourer, which the 
sober earnestness of the Sonnets and King Lear express in their barren sense of the
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futility and resultant pathos of living in a world governed by such an immutable law. Or 
contrarily, time can work to reveal, as in the formation Temporis Filia Veritas, part of the 
subtitle for Pandosto, the source-work for Shakepeare’s The Winter’s Tale. But at the 
same time, as it were, Shakespeare concedes and frees in his art an entire world of time, 
of temporality, that expresses itself to be ultimately malleable and thus playfully and 
eerily subjective. For Juliet, this view is manifestly apparent: “For in a minute there are 
many days” {Romeo and Juliet 3.1.45).
Quinones’ pointing to the individual temporal constructions drawn into the 
characters of Macbeth and Richard III, and each character’s “boundless desire" suggests a 
very rich expression of temporality. In other words, Richard III and Macbeth stand on 
their own as full characters, fully individualized and temporally aware people, not simply 
as types. Each stands as an individual because he lives in a temporal world which he 
attempts to control by virtue of his recognition that he alone can affect the course of 
events, of history, in his own lifetime. The primary role of inwardness, it will be my 
contention in this thesis, is gender, and the primary application of gender in these plays is 
melancholy. Through physical cause adhering to Renaissance conceptions of the 
humoral body, this melancholy is manifested as a jealousy inscribed in culturally 
sanctioned manner.
With Rosalind’s cryptic but telling comment ringing in our ears in As You Like It, 
that “Time travels in divers paces with divers persons,” we can move to a more full 
understanding of Shakespeare’s conception of the relative nature of the temporal sense in 
the individuals he created. This amounts to what David Kastan refers to in Shakespeare
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and the Shapes o f Time, borrowing the phrase from Auden, as the “complex grammar of 
forms” of time (7). Where Kastan forms his temporal taxonomy through analysis of the 
various genres, I offer that perhaps equally profitable will be the temporal taxonomy of a 
that most elusive of Renaissance emotions: melancholy. Melancholy’s bifurcation in the 
humoral body, its effects in both its natural and unnatural state, produces the melancholy 
and jealousy that will be the subject of this study, particularly as they manifest their 
individual temporal processes.
While my primary focus will be on The Winter Tale, this discussion could easily 
be extended, because Shakespeare’s deep ambivalence toward the nature of time finds 
expression in the peopling of his universe with characters forced to grapple with a time 
consistently portrayed by him as somehow out of joint. While the expression of 
temporality in Shakespeare’s plays is notoriously problematic, analysis of that expression 
can throw light on fundamental questions regarding the psychology of the characters that 
operate within the plays themselves. On one hand, Shakespeare’s free-ranging use of 
both timeless plots and characters may lead us toward an assessment that his plays can 
necessarily be inhabited only by poorly individuated and individualized characters. But 
on the other, the popular and critical reception of his work emphatically suggests 
otherwise; the great joy of encountering Shakespeare on any level comes undoubtedly 
from the very rich fleshing out of these characters that he brings about so effectively. By 
this I mean that the thrill of encountering such a shocking and carefully-limned character 
as an Iago derives from his very being in a temporally cognizable form, both with regard 
to the character’s own apparent self-awareness, and to the audience’s awareness of each
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character as an individual. Leontes’ temporality is in some ways similar to that which 
can be illustrated by analysis of Othello and Iago, but in other, marked ways, very 
different. In this thesis, then, I will clarify the temporally cognizable form of Leontes in 
The Winter ' s T a l e .
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Chapter 1:
“to be boy eternal”: Honor, Honesty, 
and Narcissistic Shame in The W in te rT a le
“Methinks you are my glass, and not my brother:I see by you I am a sweet-fac’d youth.”— Dromio of Ephesus, Comedy o f Errors
In order to explicate the temporal-sense associated with melancholy, it will be 
important first to unpack the meaning of the term itself. Melancholy has possessed and 
continues to possess rich signification, stemming from its multivalent tradition of usage 
both in early modem and modem English. In analyzing melancholy, I will explore the 
meanings that we assume in our abstracted use of the term in order to derive a 
constructive model with which to discuss the Shakespearean characters that manifest 
these qualities. I will derive this constructive model from appropriate Elizabethan and 
Jacobean texts that delineate the chief causes and effects of melancholy within the 
context of the humoral interpretive method. Further, I will utilize current psychoanalytic 
theory concerning melancholia for the light its terms will throw on this discussion. My 
method of analysis, then, combines the physical aspects of humoral melancholy with the 
intrapsychic, in order to establish the characteristics of the melancholic sufferer in early 
modem England. Establishing such groundwork will allow me to illustrate that 
melancholy has inherent and clearly identifiable temporal manifestations, which I will 
use to clarify the melancholy time-sense at work in Leontes’ derangement in The 
Winter’s Tale.
Melancholy has been used interchangeably to denote both a depressive emotional 
state as well as the physical, humoral liquid of its cause. The traditional humoral theory 
of medical knowledge posited that dominance by bodily humors served as the cause of 
emotional states in individuals. Originating with the Pythagoreans and Hippocrates in the 
sixth-century B.C., refined by Galen in the second-century A.D., and practiced 
throughout the Medieval and Renaissance periods, the humoral theory of medicine has an 
extraordinary duration as a clinical indicator of health. With relatively little alteration, 
this method of bodily interpretation was to stand as the focus of medical knowledge in 
Europe well into the seventeenth-century (Jackson 368). It is important to understand, 
then, that though the humoral theory of bodily health has been disproved, or named a 
false theory, this understanding should not blind us to its sheer endurance as a cultural 
tradition of medical knowledge. As Gail Kern Paster writes, “however empirically 
inaccurate [it is]— not true in the ordinary sense of the word— is a matter entirely 
separate from its ideological efficacy in meaning” (7). Humoralism's applicability to 
early modem drama, therefore, hinges on its applicability as a perceived indicator of 
health, illness and overall character in this period. As such, an overview of the theory 
will be helpful.
Scholars trace the origins of humoral understanding to the Pythagoreans and their 
emphasis on the magical significance of numbers (Klibansky, et al. 4). Humoral tradition 
posited that the significance of the number four in extra-human affairs was reflected 
inwardly by the significance of the number four in intra-human matters relating to health 
and character. Humoralism's proponents, therefore, maintained that the four cosmic
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elements (earth, air, fire, and water), the four seasons of the year (spring, summer, 
autumn, and winter), and the four ages in the life of man (to ages twenty, forty, sixty, and 
eighty), agreed with the bodily health of the individual, which was maintained, too, as a 
tetradic system (Klibansky, et al. 4, 10). Humoral theory thus served as the human 
application of this tetradic worldview. In Melancholy and Saturn, Klibansky, Panofsky, 
and Saxl note that the humors “controlled the whole existence and behaviour of mankind, 
and, according to the manner in which they were combined, determined the character of 
the individual” (3). Proper health was understood to be a representation of the ideal 
alignment of these humors, whereas illness was felt to be due to an improper alignment of 
the four humors, or the dominance of a specific humor.
Bodily dominance by one of the four humors— either blood, phlegm, black bile 
or yellow bile— served further to cause directly the specific characteristics of a given 
patient. These fluids were understood to be real and identifiable within the body, though 
the sites of their making and the linked effects of those sites, was understood to be 
somewhat hypothetical (Paster 8). The ascendancy of the blood humor was thought to 
create a sanguine, or cheerful countenance, whereas an imbalance of phlegm produced a 
phlegmatic character— one who was outwardly pasty and essentially timid. Dominance 
by bile, however, could lead in either of two directions, depending on the type of bile 
involved: the ascendancy of black bile led to melancholy, and the lethargic, depressive 
state that served as a synonym for it; and yellow bile led to a choleric temperament, one 
that could steer the patient toward a violent desire for perceived revenge. These four 
humors were called the natural humors, due to their relative simplicity regarding cause
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and effect in aiding the physician at diagnosing the imbalance of bodily humors. Each 
possessed an ideal corporeal temperature— sanguinity and choler tending toward the hot, 
phlegm and melancholia tending toward the cool (Klibansky, et al. 10ff.). But because 
the body was understood in the early modem period as a “semipermeable, irrigated 
container” (Paster 8), the role of these liquids within this porous body implied that certain 
variables could complicate the physician’s effort at diagnosis.
Writers in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods identified the chief variability in 
the humors to be that of temperature, as well as that concerning what were termed 
humoral “excrements” and “vapours.” Paster writes:
All parts of the humoral body were capable of containing fumes and 
smoky ‘fulinginous’ vapors that could rise from the guts to the cranium, 
winds that roared and rumbled, sharp and vehement gripings, belchings, 
gross and clammy crudities, fluids that putrefied and stank or, burning up, 
became ‘adust,’ seed that sent up poisoned vapors to the brain. The 
humoral body’s ability to regulate and release these vapors was critical to 
its solubility. (11)
The humoral temperatures associated with the four natural humors, then, could easily 
become altered by either external or internal bodily forces, and the resultant humors were 
termed unnatural. These unnatural humors’ essences then were variable. The humoral 
body’s profound instability derived largely from the cause of temperature, and the effects 
of this instability, as Paster indicates above, produced vapors and resultant humoral 
excrements which needed to be voided from the body. The relative heat or chill of these
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humors thus could drastically alter the diagnosis of the physician and directly affect the 
recommended treatment and attempt at cure of the ailment.
But rather than simply to throw up his hands when faced with so many possible 
diagnoses, the humoral physician was aided toward this end by medical texts that 
associated certain external characteristics in the affected patient with the humoral causes 
at work within him or her. Several expansive works focus specifically upon melancholy 
during this period. In one of these, A Treatise on Melancholie, written by Timothy Bright 
and published in 1586, we are told: “Of all the other humours, melancholie is fullest of 
varietie of passions” (Bright 101). Bright suggests that foremost in the diagnosis of 
melancholy should be the discernment in the patient of “a certayne fearefull disposition 
of the mind altered from reason” (1). Such fear was to be compounded in the patient with 
uncertainty, because he or she was often “doubtful and least assured” (67). Bright s 
Treatise further implies that melancholy may be the most mutable in terms of dramatic 
representation. Bright’s emphasis on the primacy of fear and doubt is clearly borne out in
other texts in the period.
In his Anatomy o f Melanchoy, published originally in 1621, Robert Burton 
indicates a similar primary expression of the disease. After noting that there are indeed 
infinite symptoms for melancholy, he suggests that preeminent among them are Fear 
and Sorrow, which . . .  are most assured signs, inseparable companions, and characters of
melancholy” (1.443). Often, Burton writes, this fear can swell into a panicked condition 
in which the afflicted individual “suspects every thing he sees and hears” (1.445). Such a 
shift into what we modems term paranoia, with its associated and resultant fury, derives
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from humoral melancholy’s tendency both to fuse with aspects of the other humors, and 
to be terrifically affected by changes in relative temperature (Bright 101). Bright and 
Burton concur on the primacy of fear and sorrow as incipient to jealous paranoia, the 
subject of which I will discuss in Chapter 2. But at the root of the affected individual’s 
fear and sadness, both Bright and Burton identify emotions associated with feelings of
embarrassment and shame.
Shame, the writers suggest, is intrinsically bound up with the concept of 
melancholy. Through the simple regret for a past action, an individual may confront the 
emotion of shame that both writers emphasize may be manifested differently within 
different individuals: some people may feel a deep sadness for a period of time only to 
snap out of that sadness successfully; others, however, become what Burton calls 
“chronick” (1. 167). Bright associates this process of lamentation as fundamental to 
understanding melancholy: “If [the cause of regret] be anything wherein we have 
displeased ourselves with, it is called shame" (84 emphasis mine). Shame represents the 
opposite of honor. Burton notes, too, that often in the melancholic individual, feelings of 
guilt relate to “some disgrace, loss, injury, abuse &c . . .” (1.448 emphasis mine), and 
that the melancholic person often portrays “fear without cause” (1.444). He or she may 
also “snarl upon every small occasion . . .  without cause” (1.450). This lack of cause 
regarding the display of various fears and sadness by the melancholic individual can be 
discussed by looking at Freud’s work on identification and the concern for melancholia.
Freud defines the term melancholia in its relation to the term mourning. Where 
mourning derives from sadness directly attributable to a known event, melancholia does
21
not. Freud identifies melancholia as a pathological form of mourning, one spurred on by 
the individual’s loss of something which “one cannot see clearly . . .  and it is all the more 
reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what has been lost 
either" (The Ego and the Id245). Freud extrapolates that “melancholia is in some way 
related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness” (245) and that this loss 
derives from the ego (247). This “object” may be a person or thing, including “what he 
himself was” (“On Narcissism” 90). Psychoanalyst Andrew P. Morrison suggests that 
“Shame is an affective response to a perception of the self as flawed, and thus inevitably 
involves narcissism [and] vulnerability” (Shame 48). The procedure to shame in The 
Winter ’sTale suggests that if narcissism means looking into the mirror and feeling that 
the image reflected represents a greater estimation than the subject values the self, then 
shame means looking into the mirror and feeling that the image reflected represents an 
estimation less than the subject values the self. Leontes’ applied narcissism therefore 
suggests that his actions in the play need to be understood as they relate to his viewing of 
himself as his Other, or correspondingly, as his viewing from the Other of his self, 
depending on his perspective. In other words, Leontes paradoxically sees Polixenes both 
as a mirror of himself and as a dangerous Other, and Leontes’ derangement in The 
Winter 'sTale therefore stems from the tragic effects of his encounter with narcissistic
shame. Hinging on an object-loss, a pre-pubescence, that is temporally irretrievable, this 
shame is manifested in a frantic concern with purity in which Leontes’ failed masculine 
identification causes him to lash out atavistically at his wife, family, and kingdom.
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The onset of Leontes’ pathological concern for purity manifests itself initially in 
the emotions of fear and sadness. The events and most importantly the language of Act 
One of the play conspire to produce its melancholy result. When Polixenes tells 
Hermione of the innocent gambols of his and Leontes’ youth, we learn that they were as 
“twinn’d lambs that did frisk i’th’sun . . . ” (1.2.67). Their bond was absolute, brotherly, 
and the text urges us to read them as twins. As such, in their boyhoods, they exchanged 
only “innocence for innocence” and “knew not/ The doctrine of ill-doing” (69-70). 
Further, time itself in those days washed over them with superfluity, and Polixenes and 
Leontes were “Two lads that thought there was no more behind/ But such a day to­
morrow as to-day/ And to be boy eternal” (62-65). This concept of eternal boyhood lies 
at the root of Leontes’ emotional problems, which derive from the following point: 
regarding their boyhood, Polixenes proclaims “Had we pursu’d that life/ And our weak 
spirits ne’er been higher rear’d/ With stronger blood, we should have answer’d heaven/ 
Boldly, ‘Not guilty’ . . . ” (1.2.71-74). The development of their “weak spirits” into those 
of “stronger blood” indicates their physical and psychological maturation from boyhood 
to adulthood— of their puberty. Polixenes suggests that this growth has direct bearing on 
his and Leontes’ fall from the grace of their youth. Indeed, had they not undergone that 
maturation, they would have remained eternally in a state of grace.
This static pursuit of agelessness is, simply put, a paradox: we do not register it as 
an option bearing any veracity. I think the play, however, makes clear that somehow 
Leontes does. His misapprehension insists that, indeed, were his boyhood life allowed to 
develop and to progress with an ageless perpetuity, Leontes would have been able to
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proclaim himself faultless and unsullied. He would be eternally pure. But as Polixenes 
projects the story, the encroachment of the feminine on the Kings’ lives, even as 
represented by lawful marriage, further seals their fall. This issue of purity, then, is 
central to an understanding of what instigates Leontes’ fury, and is manifested in the play 
as Leontes’ love and longing for a time. This time itself has a locus; it is an idealized 
moment that is fixed in the past. Leontes’ love for a locatable time compares nicely with 
the Narcissus myth itself, in which Narcissus, too, becomes obsessed with his own eerily 
locatable image. But through Leontes’ narcissistic identification in The Winter’s Tale, 
Shakespeare utterly inverts the Greek myth. In Ovid’s tale, Narcissus falls in love with 
the image in the pool he identifies as an image of an Other; in The Winter's Tale, Leontes 
mourns for the boyhood image of himself he sees reflected in Mamillius. Where the 
trajectory of Ovid’s Narcissus myth moves, therefore, from love toward death, the 
trajectory in The Winter’s Tale moves from death to love. Ovid’s Narcissus becomes 
instantly enamored of his reflected image, pines for it, and wastes away, finally, to his 
death. Leontes, on the other hand, becomes instantly horrified by his dually reflected 
images as both child and man, represented in Mamillius and Polixenes: Leontes attempts 
to coddle his youthful image, and to rage against his adult image. Subsequently, the fury 
of Leontes’ derangement wreaks deaths that must be “worked through” over the course of 
the play, and this working through pursues a trajectory from death toward love. In both 
the Narcissus myth and its inversion in The Winter’s Tale, however, the first cause is the 
same: each story’s trajectory derives from the application of traits associated from 
humoral melancholy and its own fierce derivative, jealousy.
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To clarify the trajectory of Leontes’ derangement in The Winter’s Tale, though, 
and illustrate precisely how his frenzy comes about, a careful study of what precipitates
Leontes’ rage in the text of the play will be helpful. Hermione’s questions regarding the
Kings’ sinless boyhood lead her to ask teasingly how indeed Polixenes feels the two men 
have “tripp’d since” (1.2.76). Polixes says,
O my most sacred lady,
Temptations have since been bom to’s: for 
In those unfledg’d days was my wife a girl;
Your precious self had then not cross’d the eyes 
Of my young playfellow. (1.2.76-80)
To which she answers:
Grace to boot!
Of this make no conclusion, lest you say 
Your Queen and I are devils. Yet go on,
Th’ offenses we have made you do we’ll answer 
If you first sinn’d with us, and that with us 
You did continue fault, and that you slipp’d not 
With any but with us. (1.2.80-86)
Here Polixenes makes it plain that the sin that weighs on his soul is not one regarding his 
kingship, such as murder or a similarly egregious affair of state. On the contrary, he feels 
that the two Kings would need to repent themselves only of their acceding to the 
“Temptations” signified by the feminine. Polixenes offers a paradigm in which “childish
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innocence is contrasted with adult sinfulness, and that sinfulness is then specifically 
associated with . . . women” (Kahn 233). But Hermione herself offers an importantly 
paradigmatic formula through which Shakepeare compounds Polixenes’ gendered 
formulation of the cause of his Edenic Fall.
Hennione’s retort positions femininity in the same manner in which Polixenes 
does; Hermine’s assessment of femininity’s influence on the Kings suggests that the 
women directly bring about their fall. At the most basic level, then, Hermione herself 
offers that the Queens serve as types of Eve, and that the men’s fall is indeed, a paradise 
lost, one that brings about both mortality and the unfolding of time. The women in this 
paradigm literally serve as the Satan of Eden, as the “devils” (82) Hermione identifies 
above. Where Narcissus fell in love with the reflected image he identified as an idealized 
Other, Leontes mourns for the loss of the image of the boy he sees reflected in his son, 
Mamillius, and rages against his appropriation of the virile image he sees reflected in his 
twin, Polixenes. In this way, the trajectory of Leontes’ derangement in The Winter’s Tale 
works as an inversion of Ovid’s “Narcissus” tale. Where “Narcissus” moves from a 
desperate love into death, Shakespeare’s play moves from a formulation of death into 
love, effected through his radical reworking of the Eden myth in Genesis.
Between this discussion above, in which Hermione and Polixenes establish the 
terms of the young men’s Fall, and the grasping of the hands in friendship, from 1.2.86 to 
108, Leontes discusses with his wife his wooing of her years before. Introduced by the 
conversation between Polixienes and Leontes’ wife, this wooing and the resultant 
marriage marks for Leontes in absolute terms his fall from grace. In becoming a man and
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acquiring the outward signs of manhood as signified by his marriage to Hermione, he had 
lost the Eden of his youth; these worlds, then, of youth and adulthood are to him entirely 
discrete. In other words, in The Winter ’sTale, Shakespeare offers a construction where 
youth is to Eden as adulthood is to the post-lapsarian world. Leontes’ melancholy 
therefore becomes a synecdoche for the post-lapsarian melancholy of formalized 
Christianity. Significantly, though, Leontes’ Edenic loss is brought about by the 
impinging of the feminine on that existence. As Leontes’ derangement positions his 
current regal life as corrupted, and fundamentally threatened by the world of women, so 
will he lash out at that world. Coppelia Kahn notes “The association of sin with the 
carnal pleasure legitimized by marriage betokens a guilt-ridden reluctance to accept, let 
alone appreciate, the natural desire of men for women . . . ” (233). It follows then, that 
the immediate development in the play is Leontes’ psychological disintegration.
This disintegration manifests itself in the lamenting and fearful language Leontes 
uses to portray his delusional sense of himself in relation to those around him. His 
assertion of a personal transgression of the self within the moral sphere, of his own 
sudden sense of impurity, suggests a psychological lapse into melancholy. In 
“Melancholia and Mourning,” Freud offers that “in the clinical picture of melancholia, 
dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds is the most outstanding feature” (247-8). 
These moral grounds have direct currency regarding Leontes’ crack-up.
Per Burton’s indication that the melancholic speaks to himself, while “ in
speech” (1.442 emphasis his), in the initial presentation of his derangement, Leontes’ 
words rail and glide with near incoherence, leaping from image to image, but primarily
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cluster around the concept of purity. Shakespeare portrays this loss of purity in terms that 
simultaneously illustrate both aging and cuckoldry: through the horns of the bull. “We 
must be neat; not neat but cleanly captain:/ And yet the steer, the heckfer, and the calf/ 
Are all call’d neat” (1.2.123). “Neat” here signifies clean, and yet is portrayed within this 
bovine metaphor. Leontes urges his son to clean the blemish from his nose, which he has 
just related is a veritable “copy” (1.2.122) of his own, and through the realization of this 
shared physical feature, Leontes is able to prove his all-important paternity. Moreover, 
through this conversation with his young son, Leontes explains that he thought he “did 
recoil/ Twenty-three years and saw [himjself unbreech’d” (1.2.155). Our first 
introduction to the boy had come in Archidamus’s assertion that this is a boy who “makes 
old hearts fresh” (1.1.39), and such is the case here, with tragic results. Mamillius chirps 
to Leontes: “I am like you, [they] say,” to which Leontes murmurs “Why that’s some 
comfort” (1.2.208-9). Leontes’ mind teeters between the ‘here and now’ of his Sicilian 
kingship and the ‘then’ of his pre-pubescence, when his “dagger” was to be kept 
“muzzled” (1.2.156). The wild shift from guiltless youth, as exemplified by his son, 
Mamillius, to guilty man, as represented by Polixenes, his twin, chatting with Lentes’ 
wife, is maintained by the bovine terminology of cuckoldry in the above excerpt. Indeed, 
such terminology denotes examples of impurity that should be understood to the degree 
to which Leontes’ rebukes them; indeed, it is the dual associations of the horns of these 
animals— indicative both of age and as the symbol of the cuckold— that Leontes 
indicates as signifying their impurity. “Art thou my calf?” (1.2.127) he asks his son, 
Mamillius.
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It is not insignificant that Leontes’ accusation of Polixenes and Hermione’s 
adultery follows upon Leontes’ depiction to Hermione of his wooing of her in the past, of 
his final succumbing to “Temptations.” Moreover, as Polixenes and Hermione chat 
closely, Leontes’ meticulous observation of them, and his freighted words of loathing, 
may thus be viewed as a portrayal of his own horror at having wooed Hermione in the 
past. This shifting triad in The Winter ’sTale between Leontes, Polixenes, and Hermione 
corresponds with the malleable portrait of Adam, Eve, and Satan that Milton gives us in 
Paradise Lost. Leontes’ speech recalls Satan’s jealousy when he first views Adam and 
Eve in Eden, again tinkering with the mythic structure of the biblical tale. Walking off 
with Hermione, Polixenes expresses to Leontes “We are yours i’ th’ garden” (1.2.88).
But such a correlation begs the question regarding identification of the tempter: is the 
tempter Satan or is it Eve? In Shakespeare’s play, the two appear to be grafted into one, 
Hermione, though the triad shifts as I will indicate below.
Polixenes therefore comes to serve as a mirroring agent for Leontes’ own fall into 
sin, as represented by the world of women. Indeed, Polixenes’ “virginalling” (1.2.125) 
and “paddling” (1.2.115) of the palm of Hermione’s hand, and the “pinching” of her 
“fingers” (1.2.102-103) serves as the significant emblem for Hermione’s unveiling of her 
sexuality to Leontes years before, when after “three crabbed months” she had finally 
opened her “white hand” (1.2.102-3). Leontes’ mind races from this image of his holding 
of Hermione’s hand in the past, to Polixenes making sport with it now, to what may be 
construed as either King and Hermione’s “making” of “practic’d smiles,/ As in a looking- 
glass; and then [their] sigh, as ‘twere/ The mort o ’ th’ deer” (1.2.116-118). The death of
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the deer represents the end of the hunt, and in the analogized view of the hunt as 
amorously inclined, the death here signifies the beginning of love and the end of 
innocence. Indeed, immediately subsequent to this speech, Leontes suggests that a sigh, 
in itself, “stop[s] the career/ Of laughter,” and, he adds in an aside, it is a “(note infallible 
of breaking honesty)” (1.2.287-8). That the lovers’ sigh is indicative of their fall from 
grace is brought home later, when Polixenes and Hermione head to the garden (1.2.178), 
where Adam and Eve, too, discovered shame. Clearly, then, it is Leontes’ shame toward 
what he feels in himself to be dirty, sullied and impure leads him to project this shame 
onto his double, Polixenes. Leontes pathological search for purity leads him to enforce a 
stringent moral polarity on an identification that is inherently nebulous, courting 
intimately the concept of danger.
In Purity and Danger, social anthropologist Mary Douglas analyzes the 
psychology at work in the individual’s classification of the things of the world into 
categories signifying their purity and impurity. Through this rigid delineation, which 
starts with a definition of uncleanness, or ‘dirt,’ as simply “matter out of place” (35), 
Douglas abstracts the term to its limit, to the point where displaced dirt becomes 
polarized from the notion of holiness, what Mircea Eliade identifies as the difference 
between the sacred and the profane, and what I will suggest differentiates the 
characteristics associated with melancholy and jealousy. Douglas, for example, notes 
that “Holiness and impurity are at opposite poles” (9). Leontes’ concerns with 
cleanliness, with a pre-pubescent and all-encompassing purity, clearly subscribe to this 
polarization.
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Douglas argues that such binarism is in itself unhealthy because it is inherently 
fraught with danger: “Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a 
systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting 
inappropriate elements” (35). As I suggest, the fear and sadness of Leontes’ melancholy 
reflect his attempt to perform this very task of moralistic extirpation; the systemic 
opposition of holiness and filthiness fundamentally underlies the very root of his illness. 
Douglas notes that “our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or 
idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications” (36); it is precisely Leontes’ 
“cherished classifications” that induce his melancholy, and its resultant furor. The purity 
that Leontes’seeks in an undifferentiated, timeless, idyllic world free from his own 
masculine identity, serves as “the enemy of change, of ambiguity, and compromise” 
(162). This constricted view and its entire framework is inherently exclusionary and 
narrow in its outlook. Paradoxically, only in coming to accept the world as it is, with his 
developed, virile self as an integral part of it, can Leontes in any sense come to terms 
with the idealized purity he discerns in his pre-pubescent past as, in a linear sense, the 
past. Douglas’ conclusion to Purity and Danger works well in this context:
The final paradox of the search for purity is that it is an attempt to force 
experience into logical categories of non-contradiction. But experience is 
not amenable and those who make the attempt find themselves led into 
contradiction. (162)
This contradiction is manifested in the play as the cause of Leontes’ derangement.
31
Leontes’ transference of ego onto Polixenes may be suggested by Polixenes’ 
telling use of the term “looking-glass” (1.2.117), or mirror, which, as a trope that Leontes 
uses to reflect his own guilt, uncleanness, and desperate impurity, raises the duel 
Freudian concerns for narcissism and the formation of identity. As Kahn rightly argues, 
“Despite his age, his kingship, and his fatherhood, emotionally Leontes is stuck at the 
development stage preceding the formation of identity . . .” (234). A look to Freud’s 
depiction of the mirror stage of development and the role of shame in primary narcissism 
will be helpful in clarifying what appears to be at work in Leontes’ mind.
In the mirror stage of development the child first forms a sense of him or herself 
in either the shapes of others or in his/ her mirror image. The work involved here is in 
distinguishing first the self from an external image, and then both of these images from 
thier surrounding environment. Freud suggests that this stage occurs in children between 
the ages of six to eighteen months, and Peter Sacks shows that until it moves through this 
stage, the actualized self “fails to discriminate a world genuinely other than himself’ (9). 
The individual psyche, then, is left with a fractured view of the self, and an incomplete 
discernment of a world that exists beyond the psyche. Sacks indicates that “if a child 
were to remain at this level, he would obviously fail to establish a socialized sense of 
himself or the outside world” (9-10). This limiting view hearkens to the Edenic 
perspective, in which, before the Fall, there is no “outside world.” In the process of the 
formation of the ego, and in the process of the individual’s identification, the child 
constructs itself piecemeal, until it finally constructs itself as a whole by the definition of 
the image of the ‘other’ within the setting of an environment. Thus Shakespeare depicts
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Leontes and Polixenes, the interchangable “twinn’d lambs” of boyhood, the self and the 
double, as adults whose outward trappings equally mirror one another almost precisely, 
from their wives, to their sons, to their kingdoms. This conflation of their childhood 
identification with their adult identification indicates that mirroring itself, and the 
concerns it raises regarding the issue of identity formation, may be of fundamental 
concern in making sense of Leontes’ derangement. Leontes’ projection of his own 
twisted self-image onto Polixenes in 1.2 of The Winter Tale may be said to serve 
merely to stoke the flames that he fires in his fury at himself.
Judith Butler’s study of gender identification and identity throws significant light 
on Leontes’ psychosis when she notes that “the ego as [an invisible] object is . . .  the 
permanently unstable site where it is negotiated” ( That Matter 76). That the locus
of the ego is inherently nebulous points directly toward the apparent ease with which 
Leontes’ own selfhood, or ego, is displaced onto Polixenes. The tranference in the play, 
while common enough and even normal among children (Wilden 159-160), is not 
supposed to happen in adults. Its occurrence is abetted in Leontes’ case by the obvious 
similarities between his character and Polixenes’. In his initial entrance, Polixenes cites 
the gratitude he feels toward the Leontes and his resultant debts, referring to himself as, 
correspondingly, a “cipher/ Yet standing in rich place” (1.2.6-7). The literal and 
analogical theme of this signification of “cipher,” or zero, or nothing, courses through the 
rest of the play, and Leontes’ insanity springs in part from his transferal of the outwardly 
virile trapping of his pregnant wife onto this void that Polixenes suggests. But Leontes’ 
insanity comes, too, from his acceptance of that signification of the “cipher,” of nothing,
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back in kind. As is his desire, in a show of force, Leontes subconsciously gives 
Polixenes all (Bristol 159-160) and this transfer consequently marks Leontes as a void.
As Polixenes notes, “The King hath on him such a countenance/ As he had lost some 
province and a region/ Lov’d as he loves himself’ (1.2.368-370). This concept of 
profound lack comes to define his masculinity. Polixenes thus represents Leontes’ 
masculine self, including his kingship and all of that which signifies his adult life, and 
Leontes is simply left without. The cipher, interestingly, achieves value only when 
accompanied with an “other”: as a 01 or a 10. When it stands alone it is utterly empty, 
just like Narcissus before he sees his reflection, or like Adam before he greets Eve. The 
cipher, too, therefore comes to represent, as in King Lear, both the sinned against and 
sinning man. The only way Leontes can successfully reattain his boyhood Eden, what he 
“was,” is by making Polixenes take on the attributes of what the adult Leontes “is.” And 
therefore the mirror stage offers us a paradigm within which Leontes’ ego has somehow 
been displaced and externally bound up. When he formally accuses his wife of infidelity, 
he clinches, unwittingly, his own fault: “You have mistook, my lady,/ Polixenes for 
Leontes” (2.1.81-81).
The centrality of the idea of ‘nothing’ therefore comes to define Leontes’ 
masculinity. This point is made clear throughout the first half of the play, but it is made 
most explicit when Leontes asks “Is whispering nothing?/ Is leaning cheek to cheek? is 
meeting noses?” (1.2.284-285). For if these things are mere “horsing” (288), then all, he 
suggests, is “nothing.” Indeed, he creates his own mise en abyme: 
then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing,
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The covering sky is nothing, Bohemia nothing,
My wife is nothing, nor nothing have these nothings,
If this be nothing. (1.2.292-295)
This nothing that Leontes attempts to define and to describe represents the chasm where 
what he controls is now defined by lack. David Willbem argues that “nothing” becomes 
“obsessively repeated into thing-ness: an abstraction made concrete, which subsumes 
everything else. It becomes a self-reflexive, self-generating agent of its own creation, 
produced out of the mysterious, violent, sexual ‘co-action,’ or coitus, o f ‘dreams,’ the 
‘unreal,’ ‘something,’ and ‘nothing’” (248). Leontes creates something out of nothing by 
his own demented necessity. Leontes’ sudden lack of the masculine has been supplanted 
by sheer delusion and rage. As Polixenes says as he and Camillo steal away from Sicilia: 
“Let us avoid” (1.2.468). Leontes consequently becomes this void.
Leontes’ inability to perceive the cause of his melancholia illustrates that he does 
not understand that something is very, very wrong. His melancholia itself has its root in 
this part of his psyche, and its outward manifestations can best be understood by the light 
we can throw on his subconscious mourning for the loss of his object-cathexis, or the 
subject of his wish impulse. For the melancholic, the “picture of a delusion of a (mainly 
moral) inferiority is completed by sleeplessness” (“Melancholy and Mourning” 246). 
Juliana Schiesari notes that with the displacement of the ego, “until the ego 
catastrophically implodes, rendering the sufferer unable to sleep and hence to act” {The 
Gendering o f  Melancholia 41). Burton concurs: “his complexion is altered . . .his sleep 
gone, his spirits obscured” (1.167). In his Melancholicke Humours in Verses o f Diverse
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Natures, published in 1600, Nicholas Breton, too, concurs: “No day, no night, no thought, 
no dreame, but of that doleful nature,/ That may amaze, or sore affright a most afflicted 
creature” (“An Extreame Passion” C). Thus, Leontes mumbles “Nor night, nor day, no 
re s t. . . -say that she were gone,/ Given to the fire, a moi’ty of my rest/ Might come to 
me again” (2.3.17-9). If Hermione could be eliminated as a part of the symbol of 
Leontes’ shattered ego, he would then be able to rest. Elsewhere Leontes equates sleep 
with purity:
Dost thou think I am so muddy, so unsettled,
To appoint myself in this vexation, sully
The purity and whiteness of my sheets
(Which to preserve is sleep, which being spotted
Is goads, thorns, nettles, tails of wasps. (1.2.325-329)
Hermione’s very presence represents an outward sign of his virility, of his impure ego, 
and as such she prevents his cathexis toward his sinless pre-pubescence.
But this purity Leontes seeks in the passage above is expressed as a narcissistic 
formulation. Leontes’ self is framed in the context of a reflected vision in a pool or well 
that Shakepseare utilizes in other plays, such as Othello. The “muddy” pool becomes a 
metaphor for the loss of self, but also as a narcissistic representation of the estimation of 
the self. Othello indicates that to become a cuckold he would rather “be a toad/ And live 
upon the vapor of a dungeon” (3.3.270-71). Later he links this toad-image with its 
narcissistic root in terms of a water reflective image, in expression of his profound 
feelings of shame:
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The fountain from the which my current runs 
Or else dries up: to be discarded thence!
Or keep it as a cestem for foul toads 
To knot and gender in! (4.2.59-62)
The toad is an intolerable animal in Othello’s estimation, and his narcissistic self- 
estimation, with reference to the fountain, emphasizes the shame he manifests through his 
use of these animals in a self-description. In Sonnet 35, too, Shakespeare maintains this 
narcissistic formulation in which he connects negative self worth with a dirty pool:
No more be griev’d at that which thous hast done:
Roses have thorns, and silver fountains mud;
Clouds and eclipses stain both moon and sun,
And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud. (1-4)
Clearly, in constructing this narcissistic portrait for Leontes, Shakespeare was working in 
a milieu within which he was, artistically, quite familiar.
In The Ego and the Id, Freud clarifies and refines the concept of melancholia as 
central to the formation of gender identity. When viewed within this revised framework, 
Leontes’ idealized boyhood comes more fully to serve as his object-cathexis; in other 
words, his wish-impulse is directed at that idyllic period of his life, both as recalled by 
Polixenes and as portrayed by the presence of Leontes’ young son, Mamillius. Leontes 
seeks out the object of his desire, and through narcissistic identification with it, 
internalizes it. As Butler relates: “The giving up of the object is not a negation of the 
cathexis, but its internalization, and hence, preservation” ( Trouble 62). This
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paradoxical juxtaposition of the object’s absence and presence within the mind of the 
individual must be understood in relation to the interplay between the id and the ego 
ideal, or super ego, the concept and task of which Freud proposed and clarified within 
this 1923 work. For Leontes, the cathectic qualities of the id are fettered by the moral 
check of this ego ideal. The ego must negotiate between these realms of unbounded 
desire and the limit of the moral hedge. The ego’s internalization of its original loss 
results in “anger and blame” effected through the “moral agency” of the ego ideal. This 
internalization is itself maintained within the individual in the ego, which
changes place with the internalized object, thereby investing this 
internalized externality with moral agency and power . . . .  The ego 
forfeits its anger and efficacy to the ego ideal which turns against the very 
ego by which it is sustained; in other words, the ego constructs a way to 
turn against itself. ( Gender Trouble 62)
The sanctioning power of the ego ideal, then, offers a particularly striking way in which 
to understand Leontes’ madness. The object-cathexis has been thwarted due to the 
irretrievability of what Leontes seeks: a boyhood ruled dead by the progressive nature of 
the law of time. Therefore, the sanctioning power of the ego ideal as a moral agency that 
seeks the moral perfection of Leontes’ idyllic pre-pubescence turns back upon him. The 
temporal regression Leontes seeks comes out of the perception of imbalance Shakespeare 
maintains in the social world of the play, and next I would like to analyze how these 
imbalances contribute to the melancholy aspects of The Winter Tale.
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At the outset of The Winter ’sTale we are told in a conversation between two 
courtiers that “great difference” (1.1.3-4) exists between the Kingdoms of Sicilia and 
Bohemia. But such immediate concern with difference in the play suggests that “Great 
difference, on one level, is no difference at all” (Schwartz 259). In Act One we leam not 
only that each kingdom has at its helm a vibrant King, but that these Kings “train’d 
together” in their childhoods as brothers, that each is married, and that each takes delight 
in his son. Further, since Polixenes arrival in Sicilia, Leontes has twice enjoined others to 
accept Polixenes in his place (1.2.174-177, 2.1.53-55). But the courtier’s insistence on 
difference, as Murray Schwartz suggests, urges the term’s interrogation in relation to the 
social world of the play.
Michael Bristol suggests that the initial conversation between the courtiers (1.1.1- 
46) and the subsequent discussion in which Leontes and Hermione cajole Polixenes into 
lengthening his stay in the Kingdom of Sicilia (1.2.1-56) serve as the seeds for Leontes’ 
madness. Bristol argues that these conversations must be understood insofar as they 
relate to the locally concretized period of what he terms “Yuletide time” in the play 
(158). The temporal placement of the first three Acts of the play within the gift economy 
of this Yuletide time of year, Bristol suggests, urges us to interpret the discussion 
between the courtiers noted above as especially significant. Their discussion regarding 
royal visitation signifies anything but idle chatter. Bristol shows that behind such talk 
lies the “bitter, and potentially deadly, struggle for prestige” (160). In keeping Polixenes 
in Sicilia against his will (with the explicit choice: as “my prisoner” or “my guest”),
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Leontes abuses the guest-host relationship. His attempt to delay Polixenes’ departure 
serves as an example of what Bristol calls “pre-emptive gift-giving” (160).
Indeed, where in their youth the lads had exchanged “innocence for innocence” 
(1.2.71), they are now involved in a type of symbolic warfare: “The lavish entertainment 
provided for Polixenes is prompted by Leontes’ desire to exceed his guest-ffiend in honor 
and prestige. The Bohemian courtiers are already somewhat anxious about this because 
Leontes’ exorbitant generosity may compromise their ability to offer adequate 
compensation” (160). Bristol therefore argues that Leontes’ derangement itself unhinges 
by way of a gift-economy, or potlatch, run amuck. This explication of Winter Tale 
ultimately makes sense of Polixenes’ depiction of himself as a “cipher” (1.2.6), as a zero, 
in that it keys us in to the point that he has absolutely nothing left to give. Within the 
given framework of the gift economy, Polixenes must leave Sicilia. As Bristol notes:
the guest-host relationship is one of reciprosity, balance, give and take, but 
only in the context of the longue duree. The balance is accomplished by 
means of complex imbalances, sacrifices, gifts and their redemption, 
rather than through an immediate audit or settling of accounts. (161) 
Polixenes’ desire to depart from Sicilia stems from his lack of possessing anything 
worthy of further exchange. His desire to leave is in itself a misreading of the longue 
duree-, his attempt to settle his account so quickly illustrates this point clearly. Bristol’s 
argument urges that Leontes seeks to prevent Polixenes’ departure because if he allows it 
to transpire, then he himself will be required to visit Bohemia in the future as a form of 
social reciprocity. And this is an obligation he will simply not perform.
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Leontes’ movement in Act One of The Winter’s Tale is in a sense an attempt to 
prove difference where each effort illustrates only similarity. The innocence Leontes and 
Polixenes had exchanged as youths has yielded to comparative discussion involving an 
attempted contrast of apparently identical sons (1.2.164, 171-172), and of the identical 
effects their seemingly identical wives have had upon them (1.2.77-79). Accepting 
Bristol’s explanation of the world of the play as frantic and competitive gift-giving, I 
suggest that the very method Leontes undertakes to command the fealty of Polixenes in 
this Yuletide world of gift-exchange, as either friend or jailer, indicates a desire to prove 
difference. Paradoxically, however, each attempt to do so only appears to prove 
similarity. Against this backdrop of a world based on gift-exchange stands Leontes’ 
overwhelming concern with “fixfing] . . . bourn,” or boundary, ‘“ twixt his and mine” 
(1.2.134-135). This attempt at identifying a boundary, at proving differentiation with 
Polixenes, marks Leontes’s continued preoccupation with that task until Polixenes 
departs.
It is not insignificant in the The Winter’s Tale that Polixenes’ temperament tends 
toward the melancholic. Polixenes raises the issue himself twice in 1.2: first, regarding 
his son, and second, his sadness at the conditions under which he must depart Sicilia. 
When pressed into comparing his love for his son with Leontes’ love for Mamillius (“Are 
you so fond of your young prince as we/ Do seem to be of ours?” (164-165)) Polixenes 
indicates that Florizel’s “varying childness cures in [him]/ Thoughts that would thick 
[his] blood” (1.2.171). The thickening of the blood is a prime indication of dominance by 
the humoral black bile of melancholy (Burton 170), and indeed whatever the thoughts
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that would produce such effects in him may be stanched by what he terms “varying 
childness.” The formulation of “varying childness” suggests that either the boy’s 
development or his caprice cures the father’s sadness.
Leontes’ tendency to read himself into those who surround him, to insinuate 
himself into everything that he encounters, comes as a direct result of his melancholic 
state. I suggest that the competitive aspects of gift exchange during the period of 
Yuletide time indicate that Leontes’ melancholy itself comes out of this same competitive 
drive. In his search to establish difference, Leontes goes over the edge, where a vague 
humoral melancholy breeds phantasms that the King then reifies into an overwhelming 
derangement. This is made clear in Leontes’ interactions with all the characters in the 
play.
Burton suggests that one of the chief intrapsychic characteristics of melancholy is 
that the individual formulates what in psychoanalytic terms are identified as paranoid 
qualities. “If two talk together, discourse, whisper, je s t . . .  he thinks . . .  they mean him, 
applies all to himself’ (1.450). This precise situation occurs in 1.2. of The Winter’s Tale, 
as Leontes watches Polixenes and Hermione engaged in a discussion. Thus, Leontes: 
“They’re here with me already, whisp’ring, rounding: ‘Sicilia is a so forth’ . . . ”
(1.2.218). This false suspicion of others, even to its ineluctable end— “There is a plot 
upon my life, my crown” (2.1.47)— may come to the melancholic individual even from 
whom Burton identifies as one’s “dearest friends” (1.446). Such understanding points 
out the misperception of a false reality that the melancholy mind takes for granted. 
Indeed, “generous minds are often moved with shame to despair for some publick
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disgrace” (Burton 303). In fueling the competitive urge of the Yuletide time-frame, 
Leontes generosity feeds his melancholy. The very absence that has come to define him 
leaves him tortured, and this torture stems from a possession of a muddled mindset that 
Bright frames as hinging on problems associated with memory and time.
Bright further suggests “Melancholy vapours cause obscurity in the sense and 
cause clouded reality” and that “Time,” Bright writes, “is the only cure” (103). If time’s 
dilation is the only way in which to counteract the melancholy about which Bright writes, 
then time itself is worth assessing here for what it can illustrate about the melancholic 
state. The alteration of memory (Bright 104) in the melancholic individual suggests a 
failure at some level in the temporal sense. Indeed, Bright notes that melancholy in itself 
can stem from the inability of the mind to come to terms with a past in which he or she is 
excessively displeased. Bright writes:
The memory thus fraight with perils past: and embracing only through the 
braynes disorder that which is of discomforte, causeth the fantasie out of 
suche recordes, to forge new matters of sadness and feare, whereof no 
occasion was of any time before . . . .” (105)
This assessment reestablishes shame at the root of the problem of the melancholic 
individual. The misreading of character through a misapplied temporal structuring that 
Leontes perpetrates in the play illustrates the lengths to which he goes in order to come to 
terms with this feeling of shame.
In viewing himself in his son Mamillius, in his double, Polixenes, and in 
Polixenes’ son, Florizel, Leontes incarnates various versions of himself at different
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temporal, and, therefore, to him, commensurately moral states. The significance of time 
in relation to moral worth presents itself as the fundamental theme of The Winter’s Tale, 
and the shattered temporality of a fractured mirroring is at once the most artful and 
terrifying aspect of the play. Leontes’ psychological dissatisfaction with himself creates 
versions of himself that he can treat according to his perception of that version’s just 
deserts. Adhering to the polarity to which Leontes subscribes regarding purity and its 
opposite, he must strive to terminate the representative of his virile self, that Polixenes 
represents. Polixenes’ masculinity signifies everything against which Leontes rails in his 
anger. Mamillius, on the other hand, represents Leontes as a pre-pubescent youth, and 
thus signifies that which Leontes glorifies. Finally, Leontes encounters Florizel 
ostensibly subsequent to his melancholic bout, but I will offer in Chapter 3 that Leontes’ 
lingering tendency to read the father in the son indicates that the play’s conclusion is not 
nearly so complete as it appears to be. In Chapter 3 ,1 will assess Leontes’ character at 
the end of the play, and will focus here specifically on the Mamillius Leontes creates as 
an idealized version of a part of himself.
Leontes’ synthesis of identity with his son, Mamillius, illustrates the 
melancholic’s tendency to view all that surrounds him as a sign, or a type. Leontes 
therefore formulates a metaphor that, through his son’s reaction, urges the King to act out 
at his dissatisfaction.
Leon. Mine honest friend,
Will you take eggs for money?
Mam. No, my lord, I’ll fight.
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Leon. You will? Why happy man he’s dole!
My brother . . . . (1.2.160-3)
Here Leontes identifies his unbreeched, innocent, and “honest friend,” his son, to be the 
boy the King once was. The term “honest” refers here to chastity, to lack of sexual 
awareness and experience. Leontes stumbles over this word with reference to Hermione:
be but about 
To say she is a goodly lady, and 
The justice of your hearts will thereto add 
‘Tis pity she’s not honest— honorable . . .  (2.1.65-68)
The gendering of the word “honest” refers most often to women as a sign of worth or 
value, whereas with men the corresponding term is “honor.” The ungendered youth, 
then, represented in Mamillius, serves as the ideal Leontes would like to appropriate in 
the play.
Through his mirrored identification with the boy, Leontes enables himself to ask 
his ‘innocent,’ youthful self if he would stand to be made a fool of. Mamillius’ answer 
seals the issue, and Leontes’ melancholy becomes manifested not simply as registered 
sadness at having lost a part of himself, the idyllic lost boyhood that linear time as a 
destructive force has devoured. Coupled with this fundamental understanding,
Mamillius’ answer urges the King to act. The essential purity that Leontes discerns in his 
pre-pubescence is borne out by his emphasis that then, like Mamillius in the play, he was 
“unbreech’d.” Stephen Orgel notes that in the Elizabethan period, “the ‘breeching’ of 
boys was the formal move out of the common gender of childhood . . . [which was]
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largely controlled by women, and into the world of men” ( 15). He adds
that the breeching ceremony took place around “the age of seven or so” (15). Mamillius 
banter with “yond crickets” (2.1.31) shows he approaches this age and yet remains, in 
Leontes’ terms, an unsullied, “honest friend.” This breeching, though, also refers to an 
Edenic patterning regarding the use of clothing before and after the Fall. This 
identification of the unsullied part of himself in the frame of his son Mamillius, and the 
boy’s insistence on action, galvanizes Leontes’ own will to act. Leontes seeks an 
impossible nostalgia that, the boy insists, can only be sought through violence. The 
melancholic transition to violence will be the subject of Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2:
“Hysterica passio”: Melancholy, Madness, 
and the Anxiety of Gender in The Winter Tale
“Nothing is more chaungeable than time: and therefore no thing is more perillous to the body. For as Hipocrates sayeth, The chaunging o f  times gendereth most euill, fo r  sodayne chaunging o f  colde into heate, chaungeth and appayreth bodyes: and that is fo r  that kinde suffreth not sodayne chaungings, as he sayeth. Therefore ofte sodaine chaunging o f  time, is cause o f  sicknesse . . .— Batman uppon Bartholome, 9.2
“A homed man’s a monster and a beast.”— Othello, Othello
Leontes’ jealousy in The Winter’s Tale manifests itself as neither theory nor 
conjecture: it works in the play as observable fact. Whatever the merits of his case, 
Leontes’ accusation of cuckoldry against his wife, Hermione, and his friend, Polixenes, 
serves as the realization of an applied jealousy that culminates in Leontes’ legalistic 
assertion: “I have said/ She’s an adultress, [and] I have said with whom . . .” (2.1.87-88). 
The extraordinary anger Leontes expresses toward his becoming a cuckold, and the rage 
he enacts upon the two he believes to have betrayed him, have offered critics of the play 
two key ways in which to interpret the root cause of Leontes’ jealous derangement: first, 
as an affect capable of being understood through psychoanalytic analysis of the text of 
the play; and, second, as an inevitable dramatic expression of the precarious nature of 
masculinity within the particularly rigid structure of patriarchy at work in early modem 
England. While these interpretive methods certainly offer valuable insights as to the
cause of Leontes’ derangement in The Winter’s , they fail to take into account the 
specific progression by which the humoral body manifested illness in the early modem 
period; in short, they do not assess the nature of Leontes’ derangement in early modem 
historical terms. Such an understanding is absolutely essential in coming to terms with, 
and seeking to clarify, the chilling ease with which Leontes shifts from the domination by 
the lament associated with natural, or kindly, melancholy, into the domination by the type 
of jealousy associated with unnatural, or unkindly, melancholy.
In this Chapter, I will explore early modem English physiological texts for the 
light these studies throw on the nature of the relationship between melancholy and 
jealousy within the humoral body. Against this historic backdrop, I will analyze Leontes’ 
derangement utilizing modem psychoanalytic theory pertaining to the dual inversion of 
the Narcissus and the Edenic myths, in order to assess the role this inversion plays in 
helping to define Leontes’ transition from melancholy to jealousy. I will focus 
particularly on the ways in which this nameless and unspecified desire from his idealized 
past relate to the ostensibly groundless but pathological jealousy he formulates and 
maintains against both his wife and his “twin,” Polixenes. In bridging this gap, as it 
were, between his general malaise and his murderous paranoia, Leontes’ illness serves as 
the expression of two closely related concerns: the inwardly derived accumulation of a 
physical cause— i.e., the bodily dominance of what can be interpreted as a profoundly 
“ill humor”— as well as the externally derived application of social anxieties of gender 
regarding the precarious status of masculinity in early modem England. In the end, I will
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suggest that Shakespeare expresses Leontes’ frenzy in Winter’s Tale as a 
psychological affect that exists with a commensurately frenetic temporal experience.
When Polixenes and Hermione join hands in 1.2 of The Winter’s Tale, Leontes 
looks on in horror and exclaims:
Too hot, too hot!
To mingle friendship far is mingling bloods.
I have tremor cordis on me; my heart dances,
But not for joy; not joy. (108-111)
The halting staccato, fierce alliteration, and close repetition of the words ‘too hot/ too 
hot,’ ‘mingle/ mingle,’ ‘not joy/ not joy,’ expresses performatively the emphatic shock of 
what appears to Leontes to represent his nearly inexpressible torment. But in addition to 
explaining such physical effect, the verbalization’s insistence on the role heat plays 
within Leontes signifies his explicit shift from dominance by natural melancholy to 
dominance by unnatural melancholy. This shift further illustrates that it is through his 
implicit desire to establish difference between himself and Polixenes, from the man who 
both outwardly and inwardly matches him with an uncanny similarity, that Leontes’ mind 
reacts; in other words, it is through Leontes’ fear of “mingling” in the excerpt above, at 
failing to distinguish “bourn,” or boundary, “’twixt his and mine” (1.2.134), that 
provokes him, causing his overwhelming psychological trauma. In the early modem 
period, the physical, the psychological, and the ethical were all felt ultimately to stem 
from the same humoral cause (Paster 78), and therefore the regulation of body heat 
becomes a focus of bodily and psychological health, as well as ethical well-being.
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The humoral body’s transformation from dominance by one humor into 
dominance by another hinges on what Gail Kern Paster identifies as the essential 
solubility of the humoral body (7-11). This general solubility is absolutely integral to the 
promotion of health and well-being in the humoral body, in that it promotes the healthy 
flow of the bodily fluids to the various body members; such humoral movement results in 
the overall humoral balance requisite for good health (71). This bodily solubility, further, 
relies to a marked degree on the presence and impact of heat. Timothy Bright, Robert 
Burton and Elizabethan translator Stephen Batman insist that at its proper level, heat is 
absolutely integral in promoting this general healthy flow of the body’s humors (Paster 
71). Excessive heat, however, serves as the principle agent toward causing the humor in 
dominance at that time within the body to bum up. Bright and Burton differ on this issue 
regarding terminology, but agree regarding the description and application of this 
burning.
In A Treatise o f Melancholie, Bright divides melancholy into two kinds, the 
natural and the unnatural. On one hand, the natural involves melancholy in its cool, 
thick, and natural state, what he terms “nutritive juice”; the unnatural, on the other hand, 
involves melancholy in its “adust,” or scorched, state. Bright identifies natural 
melancholy as the cause of this scorching of the natural humors, which is operated on, in 
his words, by an “unkindly heat” (1-3). Such heat produces two resultant physical 
entities: humoral excrements, and humoral vapors. When these entities come in contact 
with the brain, Bright argues, they serve as the physical cause of what he terms 
“melancholie madnesse”(2-3), a psychological state that mimics and is indistinguishable
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from choleric frenzy. Bright insists that “This furie is bred, because choler thus adust. . .  
ingendreth a greater inward disquiet and discontentment. . .  (112). Further:
Thus the hart a while being acquainted with nothing else, but domestical 
terrour, feareth everything, and the brain sympathetically partaking with 
the heart’s feare, maketh doubt, distrusteth, &c., suspecteth without cause .
. . [which leads to the] way of flight and avoydance, abhorring and fearing 
those thinges which of themselves are most amiable and gratefull. . . .  
(106)
Stephen Batman, too, foregrounds the role excessive heat plays in the humoral 
transformation from melancholic depression to melancholic frenzy.
In his 1582 translation of Bartholome’s fourteenth-century De Proprietatibus 
Rerum, what Bright identifies as natural and unnatural melancholy Batman calls 
“kindlye” and “unkindly” melancholy. Both are determined by the amount of heat 
present in them (4.11). Where “kindly” melancholy is “cold and drye,” Batman 
represents “unkindly” melancholy, under the influence of excessive heat, to be “as [the] 
burning of ashes.” Batman suggests that kindly melancholy turns to unkindly in the 
following manner:
Heat working ouermuch in [the] substaunce of fleme, bumeth it: and by 
ouermuch burning, tumeth it into burnt Cholera. (4.11)
Batman explains that this unkindly melancholy’s transformation into burnt choler, as with 
Bright’s assessment, derives from the pairing of both the internal and external physical 
effects of each humor.
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Batman continues to explain the physical causes themselves. What Batman 
identifies as the “overmuch burning” of melancholy, Timothie Bright, in his Treatise, 
terms its becoming “adust”; but despite these differences in terminology, both agree on 
the physical manifestation. Batman suggests that one caught under the grip of such a 
humor “stirreth to wrath and desire for revenge . . . .  [And] bradeth euill passions in the 
bodye . .  .” (4.10). He adds that it has “aptly evill deadly qualities” (4.11). This addition 
of “strong heate,” he continues, ultimately leads to disaster. But Batman also refers to 
those in this state as being under the influence of “Choleram nigram.” One thus affected 
possesses an intense fear for one’s life, and a “suspicion of [one’s] death.” The result of 
this “fleme” Batman terms “Passio melancholia,” which compares nicely with Bright’s 
identification of “melancholy madness.”
In addition to other delusions pertaining both to the external and internal worlds, 
Batman writes of those so possessed of this passion: “some fall into evil suspicions 
without recoverie: and therefore they hate, blame, and confound their friends, and 
sometime they smite and slaye them” (4.11). He urges that these examples are only a 
small part of the full playing out of melancholia adust, and insists that “Melancholy men 
fal into all these & many other wonderful passions” (4.11). Shakespeare’s dramatic 
representation of the humoral trajectory from melancholy that is natural to melancholy 
that is unnatural, from one that is kindly to one unkindly, is thus brought about with 
remarkably realistic medical focus in the initial portrayal we are granted of Leontes’ 
derangement.
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Shakespeare had illustrated his familiarity with such medical terminology 
regarding the humoral trajectory of melancholy five years previous to the first 
performance of The Winter’s Tale, in the “Hysterica passio” scene in King Lear. Spumed 
by daughters Regan and Goneril, Lear narrates here his own bodily transformation in 
which, by means of excessive heat, his humors become adust, dangerously burning up 
and sending vapors to his heart and brain:
O how this mother swells up toward my heart!
Hysterica passio, down , thou climbing sorrow,
Thy element’s below— Where is this daughter? (2.4.56-58)
Though ostensibly asking for his daughter Regan, Lear puns humorally here as well, 
identifying the feminized ‘mother’ as the palpable humor itself, and its daughter as the 
evil vapors that will provide him physical cause for a violent rage that comes to signify 
both affect and effect. Importantly, Lear narrates his own physical illness and suggests 
the extent to which the physical will become psychological: “I prithee, daughter, do not 
make me mad” (2.4.218). By locating such humoral terminology within King Lear, I 
urge that Shakespeare was both familiar with, and made use of, such medical discourse 
within his plays.
Leontes’ specificity regarding his heart as the site of this trauma is telling in itself, 
and has not been grappled with yet critically in humoral terms. To be sure, critics of the 
play have all shared in the specificity involved in Leontes’ offering of a physical locus as 
the seat of his pain. In “Patriarchy and Jealousy in Othello and The Winter's Tale,” for 
example, Derek Cohen acknowledges this “clinical specificity” o f “tremor ” in
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itself as a “brilliant dramatic stroke” (211); Cohen fails, however, to appreciate what this 
term in all probability signified to the play’s early modem audience. Stephen Batman 
entertains the subject in De Proprietatibus Reru, and it is worth investigating his 
assessment of the heart for the light this investigation can throw on Leontes’ assertion.
After explaining the physical elements of the heart, Batman suggests that the heart 
is the “beginning and well of bloud and . . .  the beginning and well o f moving [i.e., 
emotion], of liking, and of unliking. And generally of all wits, the moving beginneth in 
the heart, and thereunto restoreth, and the vertue thereof is spred and staight into all the 
members, and after one manner” (5.36). In this way, the heart “bringeth to every of them 
proper life and proper kinde heat” (5.36). Although the heart requires blood that is “in 
quantitie and qualitie . ..  full hot and moist, for the heart is a member, in which [this] is 
the first virtue” (5.36), if this heat comes in an extreme, then there will be tragedy:
For if passing heat have mastrie in the heart, the bloud of the heart boyleth 
and moveth, and so the vitall spirite is grieved . . . .  Also the heart 
sometime quaketh . . . And so it seemeth to the to a sicke man, yf the heart 
moveth from place to place. (5.36)
This activity Batman calls “Cardiaca passio.” The ‘moving’ of the heart, or the strong 
emotion toward like or dislike, turns to ‘movement’ in the heart, and thus it palpitates, as 
Leontes tells us. Batman explains this term as follows:
Also it happeneth that the heart hath a default that cometh of wasting of 
spirites, and of spiritual vertue and of passing out of spirits. And this doth 
chaunce either of too great repletion that grieveth and confoundeth the
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vertue, or else of too great wasting, that wasteth the vertue, as it fareth in 
them that have a Cardiaca . . . .  Also sometime the heart is grieved by 
some fumosities of smoake, corrupt and venimous entering to the heart, 
and corrupting the openings of the heart, whereupon death followeth 
anone. (5.36)
Batman’s discussion of the heart’s role in effecting illness in the humoral body insists on 
our re-interpretation of the explicit role the humors play in Leontes’ derangement.
Indeed, if the “melancholy humour” can be said to “constrayneth and closeth the heart” 
(4.11), creating a heart that flutters, then we ought to interpret this scene as one that is 
humorally induced. Burton, too, notes that a common effect of this type of melancholy is 
“palpitation of the heart”(l .443). As a physiological reality understood as truth by 
Elizabethan humoral medicine, the burning of humors could lead to humorally induced 
heart palpitations. This trouble is precisely what Leontes identifies in his “Too hot, too 
hot!” speech. His dual articulation of the role heat plays and of the term “ ”
represents, then, not simply a precious or quaintly deluded expression, in equal measure 
both intriguingly specific and equally vague. On the contrary, Leontes’ expression 
clearly and very specifically points to a subjective expression of illness that adheres to an 
early modem understanding of the nature of physical cause and effect within the humoral 
body.
As with Lear, Leontes narrates his dilemma to the audience, and I believe that this 
narration is, in itself, far from insignificant. Leontes identifies for the audience the root 
of his illness, and thereby raises a number of classic narcissistic issues deriving from
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Ovid’s Narcissus myth, with which Shakespeare was so familiar. Through his use of 
mirroring imagery throughout the play, Shakespeare constructs a situation in which we 
ought to interpret Leontes narration in narcissistic terms. Because the fundamental 
concept at the root of narcissistic interpretation involves the psychological interpretive 
qualities of the “gaze without” and the “gaze within,” and because Robert Burton, in The 
Anatomy o f Melancholy, identifies this form of interpretation as defining the melancholic 
who transforms from a natural to an unnatural melancholy, I suggest we come to a 
situation in which Shakespeare formulates the root disjunction in the play. Shakepseare 
constructs in Leontes a man whose misreading of external clues in his “gaze without,” 
causes him to construct a paradoxically “proper” medical diagnosis; in other words, an 
ostensibly well-formulated “gaze within.” By tinkering with the early modem English 
audience’s sense of dramatic reality, by constructing a simple yet profound psychological 
disjunction, Shakespeare radically problematizes in Leontes the Narcissus myth.
When Leontes looks beyond himself, he misreads his wife and best friend, his 
double, cuckolding him. This cuckoldry he cannot bear, so he looks within himself and 
constructs and narrates all the verifiable medical data of the period— the heat, the 
fluttering heart— to produce a diagnosis that confirms what he sees outwardly. We in the 
audience know that what Leontes sees outside him is false, is a misreading of reality, so 
should we not therefore assume that Leontes’ medical diagnosis, too, is false? In the 
classical myth, Narcissus views his idealized self in a pool and falls hopelessly and 
fatally in love with this image.
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He dreams upon a love that’s bodiless . . .  in sum, he now is struck with 
wonder by what’s wonderful in him. Unwittingly, he wants himself; he 
praises, but his praise is for himself; he is the seeker and the sought, the 
longed-for and the one who longs; he is the arsonist— and is the scorched. 
(Ovid 94)
In The Winter ’sTale, Shakespeare formulates an inversion of this myth, in which, 
brought on by his inward shame, Leontes’ gaze without seeks to discern confirmation of 
this inward shame by constructing it outwardly. When he does so, he projects it, or 
displaces it, onto Polixenes and Hermione in a culturally prescribed manner: as a shame 
brought on by cuckoldry anxiety. This misreading of the outward must be understood as 
a projected image in itself, and, consequently, the hatred Leontes enacts on his childhood 
and adulthood mates, as I suggested in Chapter 1, is in reality one he enacts upon himself.
This disjunction between the “gaze without” and the “gaze within” in the play 
raises a simple and fundamental issue: can one gaze be false while simultaneously the 
other gaze is true? Such a question is important in a dramatic way, because it ultimately 
defines the difference between catharsis, the purgation of desire, and cathexis, its 
projection, or, in other words, between anagnoresis and exposition. In this way, The 
Winter ’sTale can and perhaps ought to be read as a reverse tragedy, in that the moment 
of tragic insight (anagnoresis) occurs in the beginning of the play. Because that 
perception, that moment of insight, is “false,” however, though all the trappings that 
adhere to it are ostensibly “true,” the play therefore fails to follow the path of tragic
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determinism. The Winter’s Tale begins where tragedy usually ends, and this construction
is what pushes it beyond the traditional realm of the tragic.
The form of Leontes’ jealousy, however is indeed a textbook case, and its 
development, in humoral terms, from the melancholy humor in its natural state to the 
melancholy humor in its adust, unkindly, or unnatural state, is carried forth precisely as 
Leontes indicates, and as contemporary physicians of the early modem period suggest.
In his Anatomy o f  Melancholy, Robert Burton treats jealousy in its direct relation to 
melancholy. He insists that the two are inseperable: the “melancholy are apt to be 
jealous, and [the] jealous apt to be melancholy” (3.3.1). Yet he acknowledges that 
jealousy ultimately “ought to be treated as a Species apart. . . being so furious a 
passion”(3.3.1). Indeed, he notes that it is a particularly strong passion among men, 
because, ultimately, “All women are slippery, often unfaithful to their husbands . . .
(3.3.1). Further, “[female] beauty and honesty have ever been at odds” (3.3.1). Honesty 
here may be read as meaning “faithful” or “chaste” within marriage, and in this 
patriarchal system, both in the world of the play, and that which existed in early modem 
England, Burton identifies here the roles culture and gender play in defining the term. 
After all, Burton continues, given that women stray, “how can [a man] choose ..  . but be 
suspicious, and instantly jealous?” (3.3.1).
The trajectory of male jealousy, Burton insists, is ultimately one of inevitability: 
“Those which are jealous, most part, if they be not otherwise relieved, proceed from
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suspicion to hatred, from hatred to frenzy, madness, injury, murder, and despair” (3.3.3). 
This movement is precisely that which unfolds in Winter’s Tale, and it is important 
to realize that such a movement derives from Renaissance understanding of the 
transformation from the melancholy body to that which is melancholy turned adust. 
Burton indicates cause for jealousy by one under the influence of melancholy adust, 
which shares unique phrasing with The Winter’s : here Burton identifies a 
triangulated dramatic scenario in which a jealous husband watches a man “sitting by her 
[the husband’s wife], and paddling palms and pinching fingers” (3.3.1.). Shakespeare 
portrays this very scene in both Othello and The Winter’s Tale. Iago focuses on the hand 
as the locus for sensual sin; he asks Roderigo, “Didst thou not see her paddle with the 
palm of his hand?” Then continues:
Lechery, by this hand; an index and obscure 
Prologue to the history of lust and foul thoughts . . . .
Villanous thoughts, Roderigo! ( 2.1.254-55, 257-58, 260)
This focus on the hand is maintained by Othello in the throes of his pathological jealousy 
at 3.4.36-47, in which he, too, identifies hands as the site of licentiousness. Similarly, 
Leontes watches Polixenes and Hermione together and laments them “paddling palms 
and pinching fingers,/ As now they are, and making practic’d smiles/ As in a looking 
glass . . . ” (1.2.115-117). Leontes’ anger, as with Othello’s, as I shall argue below, arises 
out of his melancholy turning adust, and the vagueness of the melancholy identified 
earlier in the scene immediately begins to be directed and focused on to his externalized 
Other.
59
Burton writes that “In addition to the Fear and Sorrow . . .  common to all 
Melancholy, anxiety of mind, suspicion, aggravation, restless thoughts . . .  [the jealous] 
are farther yet misaffected, and in the higher strain” (3.3.2). “Jealousy,” he continues, 
citing Vives, “begets unquietness in the mind night and day” (3.2). Interestingly, here, in 
Burton’s construct, jealousy begets its effect in the mind, charging jealousy as a 
masculine emotion, while feminizing the melancholy mind thus affected. This 
emasculation is precisely what the cultural fear of cuckoldry implies, and as such, 
jealousy’s hyper-masculinity supplants its feminized host. Burton suggests further that 
the jealous man “hunts after every word he hears, every whisper, and amplifies it to 
him self. . . with a most unjust calumny of others, he misinterprets every thing [that] is 
said or done, most apt to mistake or misconster, he pries into every comer, follows close, 
observes to an hair.” We clearly see this pattern in Leontes derangement:
Didst perceive it?
They’re hear with me already, whisp’ring, rounding,
“Sicilia is a so-forth.” ‘Tis far gone,
When I shall gust it last. (1.2.216-219)
So Leontes, in the initial manifestation of his passionate jealousy, begins to illustrate 
elements of what we modems would call paranoia. Further, he “misinterprets,” 
“mistake”s and “misconster’s in Burton’s words, applying “all to himself.” Echoing 
Iago’s goading of Othello through intense verbal manipulation, Leontes, as Harold 
Bloom’s suggests, goads himself: Camillo naively explains that Polixenes has agreed to 
remain in Sicilia, to which Leontes demands: “Ay, but why?”
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Cam. To satisfy your Highness and the entreaties 
Of our most gracious mistress.
Leo. Satisy?
Th’ entreaties of your mistress? Satisfy?
Let that suffice. (1.2.231-235)
Further, Burton identifies that the jealous man portrays a theatrical and dramatic 
representation, in which symptomology becomes performance. These include “strange 
gestures of staring, frowning, grinning, rolling of the eyes, menacing ghastly looks 
broken pace, interrupt, precipitate, half-turns. He will sometimes sigh, weep, sob for 
anger,. . . swear and belie, slander any man, curse and threaten, brawl, scold, figh t. . . ”
(3.3.2). Hermione notes that Leontes holds “a brow of much distraction” (1.2.149), and 
Polixenes later indicates to Camillo that as he greeted him “with customary compliment,” 
Leontes “Waft[ed] his eyes to th’ contrary and [letting] fall/ A lip of such contempt, 
speeds from me . . . .  I saw his heart i n ’s face” (1.2.371-373, 447). Leontes’ portrays a 
countenance that is culturally constructed and freighted to indicate his jealousy 
dramatically.
Burton insists that the jealous man’s actions are typified by paranoia: he is
mandering, gazing, listening, affrighted with every small object: why did 
she smile, why did she pity him, commend him? why did she drink twice 
to such a man? why did she offer to kiss, to dance? &c., a whore, a whore, 
an arrant whore!” (3.3.2)
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This expression nearly reads as if it were lifted directly from the play itself, indicating 
that in early modem English drama, the discourses regarding the medical and the 
dramatic appear to develop side by side. With Polixenes fled north to his Kingdom of 
Bohemia, Leontes directs a sadistic rage at Hermione. He publicly humiliates her: “ ’Tis 
pity she’s not honest” (1.2.68) he bellows; “O thou thing!” (1.2.82) he berates; “she’s a 
traitor” (1.2.89), a “bed-swerver” (1.2.93), he hisses; and, finally, he concludes: “Away 
with her, to prison!” (1.2.103). In humoral terms, Leontes is consumed with rage due to 
his melancholy adust, and due to the shame he assumes from narcissistic patterning, the 
hatred which he would direct at himself is displaced, transferred onto those whom he 
feels signify his corruption, and he eagerly seeks to punish them. Lear, for example, 
immediately subsequent to his “Hysterica passio” scene, rages wildly at his daughters.
The portrayal of Leontes’ jealousy thus comes out of a medical tradition and a 
subjective anxiety both physiologically and socially centered on the humoral body. But 
equally at work in this schema is the psychological manifestation of the words of the 
play. As Murray Schwartz insists, countering years of critical assessment, the jealousy in 
The Winter’s Tale“dramatize[s] not ‘motiveless’ jealousy, but jealousy whose motivation 
is embodied in the structure of linguistic and personal relationships acted out on the stage 
(and in our minds)” (“Leontes’ Jealousy” 251). Schwartz’s psychoanalytic reading of the 
play indeed lays great emphasis on these twin concerns for inter-personal relationship of 
the characters in the play, and the impact the language of the play itself has on the minds 
of the audience. Leontes’ jealous derangement is explicitly unnerving; at the same time, 
however, it is also implicitly so. Act 1, scene 2, of The Winter’s Tale allows us to trace
62
the unhinging of a mind due to a failed identification both narcissistic and Edenic in 
application. Indeed, the role of melancholy can be extended to its psychological 
application regarding these dual concerns insofar as they cast light on the cause of 
Leontes jealousy.
Stephen Orgel highlights the importance of the Edenic aspect of this aspect of the 
play when he writes “Critics for two hundred years have declared Leontes’ paranoid 
jealousy inexplicable, but within the context of that dream of what it means to be a child, 
Leontes’ behavior is not only understandable, it is in a way inevitable” (.
16). Orgel emphasizes that Leontes’ rash outburst occurs even as Polixenes relates the 
idealized nature of his and Leontes’ youth. Orgel’s suggestion certainly points us directly 
toward the immense weight of this fantasy to the play:
Behind the outrage of public modesty is a real fear of women’s sexuality; 
and more specifically, of its power to evoke man’s sexuality[. Tjhis is the 
fear expressed in Polixenes’ Edenic fantasy about life before puberty, and 
in Leontes’ paranoid retreat from his wife. It is a fear that denies the 
claims of the gynecology of inverted, incomplete masculinity, a fear 
grounded in a recognition not of sameness but of difference, and of the 
desire that proceeds from it. (49)
This recognition of difference in The Winter ’Tale, as I have argued above, is a central 
one to the play as a whole. Orgel insists that “This desire is dangerous because it 
proceeds from non-rationality” (49). The perception of delineating the rational from the 
non-rational points us toward the construction of gender identities in the Renaissance
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period, because melancholy and jealousy are applied here as gender-specified emotions. 
Leontes’ jealous fury, too, is in itself a clear manifestation of melancholic pathology, in 
the psychoanalytic sense. Freud notes that the melancholic individual can formulate an 
impassioned rage stemming from that individual’s “narcissistic wound” resulting from 
the “abandonment” (Schiesari 47) of the object-cathexis. In Freud’s words, if
the love for the object— a love which cannot be given up though the 
object itself is given up— takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then 
the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, 
debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its 
suffering. (“Mourning and Melancholia” 251)
Leontes’ delusion and rage in The Winter’s Tale insists that if Hermione could be 
eliminated, as a symbol of his shattered ego, he would then be able to cease his fears.
Her very presence is a sign of his virility, o f his impure ego, and as such she prevents his 
cathexis toward the sacred time Leontes desires: his sinless pre-pubescence. Murray 
Schwartz notes that in paranoia, the individual enters
a form of psychic imprisonment in which the loss of ego boundaries 
makes the world nothing but a confluence of symbols, selected according 
to subjective and ambivalent wishes and fears. For the paranoid, others 
become what D.W. Winnicot has called “subjective objects,” 
embodiments of psychic realities that exist only in relation to the subject. 
(“Leontes’ Jealousy” 262)
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The manner in which Shakespeare portrays Leontes’ derangement clearly works along 
these lines, in which Leontes’ objective reality exists as a patterned construction of his 
own inward trauma.
In “Discourse of the Other,” Anthony Wilden suggests from the Lacanian 
perspective that “Aggressivity is intimately linked to identification, notably in paranoia, 
where the subject’s persecutors may turn out to be those with whom he had once 
identified himself: the other we fear is often the other we love” (161). Leontes’ paranoid, 
jealous display seeks to doom and to annihilate those whom previous to his lapse had 
served to define his own masculine subjectivity. It is natural that in a pathologically 
jealous state where his ego has rebelled with horror at his own impurity and thus been 
projected onto another, Leontes would seek to destroy this projection as an aspect of what 
he loathes within himself. Where the normative melancholic individual might pursue 
suicide in order to do away with the object of his or her torment, which is the ego itself 
( The Ego and the Id  53), Leontes’ displacement of his negotiated ego onto his double, 
Polixenes, causes him to target that which represents his adult self and the world that it 
inhabits. His attempted destruction of both his boy- and adulthood mates highlights what 
in the next section of this Chapter I will outline as Leontes’ own failed masculine 
identification.
Mark Breitenberg emphasizes that in humoral physiology, differences in emotion, 
passion, and ultimately of gender, depend on fluid variation pertaining to heat and 
relative density of the blood and the humors, i.e. their thickness or grossness. Men and
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women in the humoral system were understood to have differing ideal corporeal 
temperatures, women tending toward the cool, men towards the hot (Paster 78-84). The 
incorporation of gender difference into the humoral bodily schema, then, served not as 
one of sexualized physical polarity, or of such a binarism, but one of humoral variability 
hinging ultimately on relative temperature (Paster 16-17, 103 ff). Judith Butler’s 
insistence in Gender Trouble, that “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of 
gender” (25) helps to locate the actuality in the early modem humoral body, that the cold 
aspects of melancholy caused in the male a movement away from the heat associated 
with masculinity and toward the temperature associated with the feminine. The cool and 
dry associated with melancholy, however, aided humoral physicians in thereby 
constructing an image of melancholy as in a sense a feminizing disease. The melancholic 
man “is characterized by his feminine qualities” (Breitenberg 14, 54), which include 
“inconstancy and changeability, moodiness, sullenness, an inability to be governed by 
reason, [and] the excess of passion and imagination” (54). Breitenberg emphasizes that 
the gendered aspects of these characteristics stems essentially from the effects of 
temperature on the humoral body.
In The Gendering o f Melnacholia, Juliana Schiesari explores the unique cultural 
role melancholy plays in the Renaissance as an arena for the masculine subject to enact a 
discursive symbol of intangible loss. Schiesari analyzes the empowering role melancholy 
offered Renaissance men as a specifically gendered emotion, constructed as it was out of 
a feminization of the masculine subject thus affected. Schiesari is interested primarily in 
investigating how women, how those gendered as feminine, are thus prevented by their
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very femininity from becoming “culturally sanctioned” (17) as melancholic subjects. 
Women’s loss, she suggests, becomes thus relegated in two ways: first, away from the 
intangible to the real, as in the mourning for the death of loved ones; or, second, to 
hysteria (17). Schiesari works from this gendered and psychoanalytic groundwork to 
investigate men’s exclusive appropriation of melancholy as an empowering agent during 
the Renaissance. Indeed, Schiesari suggests melancholia as “an elite ‘illness’ that 
afflicted men precisely as the sign of their exceptionality, as the inscription of genius 
within them” (7). This groundwork is important in that it locates melancholy as a 
specifically masculine disease, one that thrived on and derived artistic power from what 
Schiesari identifies as the “appropriation of the sense of lack” (15).
In serving as a discursive arena for those characteristics “deemed contrary to a 
specifically masculine vision of social order and individual rationality” (Breitenberg 38), 
melancholy comes to serve as what Breitenberg calls “the Other within” (39).
Melancholy therefore becomes associated with what is dangerously irrational:
melancholy enables and sustains masculine subjectivity, despite its 
torturous effects, precisely because its articulation allows for the 
projection and disavowal of internalized forces that threaten masculinity. 
Put simply, the discourse of melancholy plays its part in the cultural 
construction of the early modem (male) subject by providing a mutable 
category against which masculinity may then (anxiously) define and 
defend itself. (39)
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The movement away from rationality indicates this movement away from the masculine, 
because as Kathleen McKluskie has identified, in its own terms patriarchy becomes “the 
only form of social organization that can hold chaos at bay” (McKluskie 99). In this 
sense, melancholy takes on characteristics of what Juliana Schiesari, building off Levi- 
Strauss’ term, calls a “floating signifier” (40), in that it accrues the terms and emotions 
that fail to adhere to this rationalism Breitenberg identifies as masculine. Schiesari, too, 
suggests that the melancholic individual accrues in melancholy an arena to appropriate 
feminized characteristics, and Breitenberg insists that with this feminization comes an 
implicit anxiety that is channeled into culturally specified, even culturally sanctioned, 
fields insistent on “knowing”: jealousy and cuckoldry anxiety.
Breitenberg argues that jealousy and cuckoldry anxiety are the logical effects of 
male subjectivity in a patriarchal system. They are “an unavoidable response to the 
contradictions of the very same patriarchal system that has engendered [the masculine] 
identity in the first place” (176). Renaissance men, Breitenberg suggests, constructed and 
inhabited a world runs rife with an uncertainty regarding the status of the power of its 
masculinity, and this uncertainty, he argues, is manifestly evidenced in the artistic work 
of the period. In attempting to discern why jealousy and cuckoldry anxiety are “so 
pervasively written about, nervously laughed at, ritualized, [and] theatricalized” in 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England, Breitenberg suggests that they ultimately “[expose] 
the fundamental paradox at the core of masculine subjectivity” (183). Breitenberg argues 
that
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If we realize that the discourse of cuckoldry and male sexual jealousy is 
not necessarily congruent with the actual occurences of adultery or sexual 
promiscuity, the preponderance of false accusations . . . suggests that 
merely charging women with infidelity must have itself provided an 
enabling function for men. A husband’s accusation functions to pre-empt 
and thus compensate for the impotence and dishonor he seems to have 
regularly feared as a result of anticipating his own cuckoldry . . . .  (183 
emphasis mine)
This understanding gels very effectively with Leontes jealousy and intense fear of being 
cuckolded in The Winter’s Tale. Given the physical humoral cause of his shift into 
jealousy, its application is equally determined by the anxieties surrounding masculine 
subjectivity in Renaissance England. As Othello says: “A homed man’s a monster and a 
beast” ( Othelo4.1.62). Nowhere in The Winter’s Tale is this point more clear than in
1.2.185-207.
Leontes’ soliloquy serves as a cultural and dramatic expression of the patriarchal 
world he inhabits. He identifies as a “fork’d one” and insists he plays “so disgraced a 
part, whose issue/ Will hiss [him] to his grave” (187-189). Leontes moves from personal 
fears of the “disease” of cuckoldry, however, to a more broad application of it.
There have been 
(Or I am much deceiv’d) cuckolds ere now,
And many a man there is (even at this present,
Now, while I speak this) holds his wife by th’ arm,
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That little thinks she has been sluic’d in ‘s absence,
And his pond fish’d by his next neighbor— by 
Sir Smile, his neighbor. (190-196 emphasis mine)
This movement from focus on the individual woman to focus on all women, too, appears 
to be a hallmark of the application of masculine anxiety in early modem England. 
Leontes’ fear of cuckoldry here, specifically in his use of the term “Now,” echoes Iago’s 
use of the term in Othello, and raises interesting issues regarding subjective temporality, 
of time itself, in the pathologically jealous individual. “Even now, now, very now, an old 
black ram/ Is tupping your white ewe” (1.1.88) Iago bellows to Desdemona’s father, 
Brabantio. Such a frantic formulation of time, one in which time itself cannot move 
quickly enough from the point of view of the speaker, will be the subject of Chapter 3 of 
this thesis.
To conclude, Leontes’ melancholy, jealousy, and cuckoldry anxiety are all 
culturally constructed effects as they are portrayed in The Winter Tale. His melancholy 
stems from a physical, humoral cause rooted in Renaissance medicine; jealousy derives 
from his melancholy becoming adust when, as he narrates for us, too much heat bums up 
that humor. Both melancholy as depression and jealousy as a result o f melancholy turned 
adust, are cultural and gender constructs in early modem England, freighted with 
meanings that implicitly interrogate the masculine subjectivity of the person who portrays 
the symptomology of either disease. Cuckoldry anxiety serves in early modem England 
as the applied means by which a threatened or impotent masculinity could assert itself. 
The Winter ’sTale, therefore, in historicist terms, works as a literal playing-out of the
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variation allowed within the bounds of Renaissance masculine subjectivity. The 
temporalities associated with these passions will serve as further illustration of this 
subjectivity, as I will illustrate in my final chapter.
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Chapter 3:
“I could afflict you farther”: Melancholy, Jealousy, 
and Chronotopic Derangement in The Winter Tale
“Nothing is more precious than time, Wherefore of each possession two may be had together or more: but of time two moments may not be had together. And time lost cannot be recovered, for losse of time is short, chaungable, unstable, and unrecoverable . . .— Batman uppon Bartholome 9.2.
In Shakespeare and the Shapes o f  Time, David Scott Kastan explores the role 
generic divisions can play toward helping to elucidate the various temporalities 
Shakespeare enacts in his dramatic work. Kastan suggests that Shakespeare’s complete 
break with the providential time associated with the Medieval period, and pursuit of what 
Kastan, citing Ricardo Quinones, refers to as “Renaissance explorations of time” (5-6), 
allowed Shakespeare to investigate what Kastan terms “radical temporality” (3). The 
pursuit of this representation of time, Kastan urges, resulted in Shakespeare’s efforts “to 
explore with unparalleled energy and originality ways in which dramatic structures are 
intimately connected with differing conceptions of the human experience in and of time” 
(6-7). Shakespeare emphasizes the individual’s temporal experience most clearly, Kastan 
suggests, in the tragedies, and within what Kastan identifies as tragic time. Following E. 
M.W. Tillyard, J. H. P. Pafford, and Stanton B. Gardner, among others, I read the first 
three Acts of The Winter’s Tale as essentially tragic in formulation, and will work closely 
in this Chapter with Shakespeare’s other great study of tragic jealousy, Othello, in order
to illustrate how the tragic time Kastan associates with this Shakespearean tragedy 
equally can be shown to inform this Shakespearean romance.
In the first part of this Chapter I will illustrate how Kastan’s generic taxonomy 
of time may serve as a point of departure toward investigation of the role Renaissance 
passions play in explicating the temporal identities at work in Shakespearean drama. 
Kastan’s suggestion that Shakespeare’s clearest expression of an individual’s subjective 
experience lies within the tragedies offers a starting-point toward investigation of this 
subjectivity and the role that subjective emotional experience plays within it. I will argue 
that the two emotions I have explored in Chapters 1 and 2, melancholy and jealousy, 
carry implicitly within them commensurate temporal senses that can be used to clarify 
Leontes’ character, in addition to other melancholic Shakespearean characters. In the 
second part of this Chapter, I will analyze how Leontes’ derangement manifests itself in 
The Winter’s Tale, and will suggest that Shakespeare’s treatment of time in the play leads
to a resolution that is in fact far more ambiguous than has yet been suggested. It is 
important to note at the outset Kastan’s insistence that “No one of Shakespeare’s generic 
commitments reveals ‘things as they are’ any more or less accurately than any other” (32- 
33); indeed, Kastan emphasizes that generic temporal differences stem only from the 
different ways in which we view our world, not that any one generic manner is decidedly 
more valid than any other (173) toward ordering “the chaos of reality” (11). “Radical 
temporality,” therefore, comes to be best understood as analysis of how the perceiver 
subjectively constructs his or her temporal reality, and I suggest that often this perception 
may be seen to derive from the individual’s emotional state.
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Individual time-sense is an integral part of subjectivity, and this subjectivity 
derives largely from the individual’s interaction within the social world in which he or 
she plays a part. In The Watched Pot: How We Experience Time, Michael G. Flaherty 
contextualizes the role such interaction plays in the individual’s construction of a 
temporal reality:
Human interaction— including of course, temporality— is always 
embedded within the dynamics of social interaction . . . .  Different kinds 
of interaction generate different modes of experience, and different modes 
of experience represent different realms of being. (140-41)
In this work, Flaherty documents individual case studies of subjective feelings of time 
compression or dilation stemming directly from varied emotional states. Time sense is 
manifested, Flaherty suggests, by our different subjective, and impressionistic, 
constructions of a peopled reality, and from the emotional states that adhere to them. 
Murray Schwartz, in a similar vein, locates dramatic meaning in direct relation to social 
interaction upon the stage, in which the audience formulates meaning “embodied in the 
structure of linguistic and personal relationships acted out on the stage (and in our 
minds)” (“Leontes’ Jealousy” 251). I suggest that to chart the interaction of dramatic 
characters is ultimately to clarify them as characters, and that to clarify them is ultimately 
to locate their respective temporalities. Iago’s character, in other words, is not Iago’s 
character unless it contains within it the corresponding temporal-sense of Iago’s 
character. I will illustrate below how Shakespeare constructs in Iago a temporal-sense 
strong enough, and destructive enough, to bring about tragedy.
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Kastan suggests that tragic time, hinging on a time-sense that is “existential” and 
“personal” (79), works as what approaches closely to an expression of subjectivity. 
Indeed, Kastan notes that Shakespearean tragedy “finds shape and significance in the 
temporality of the individual life rather than in the continuous flow of historical time” 
(80). This stress on individuality represents the “experiential time of human life— a time 
that like life itse lf. . .  is directional, irreversible, and finite” (80). While Kastan shields 
us from assuming that all time is simply subjective to the observer (79), he concedes that 
the perception of time in Shakespeare’s plays impacts the individual in profoundly 
different ways that generally adhere to the generic form of the play in which the character 
exists. With its simultaneous emphasis on the “experiential time of human life” as well 
as on a sense of time that is linear and ultimately “finite” (80), Kastan’s tragic temporal 
formulation serves as a solid groundwork for interpretation of emotional subjectivity.
This emotional subjectivity can be evinced either through the humoral analysis of 
Renaissance bodies, or through a modem psychoanalytic reading of the “character” 
within the work of art. Either way, this psychology carries with it a type of temporal 
being that carries with it a respective time-sense. Melancholy has clearly identifiable 
temporal manifestations, although they are often nebulous in application. Take, for 
example, Romeo’s hazy bout with melancholy as he pines for his first love, Rosaline.
Benvolio Good morrow, cousin.
Romeo Is the day so young?
Ben. But new struck nine.
Rom. Ay me, sad hours seem long . . . .
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Ben. . . .  What sadness lengthens Romeo’s hours?
Rom. Not having that which, having, makes them short. {Romeo and 
Juliet 1.1.160-164)
What Robert Burton would identify here as love-melancholy serves as an illustration of 
the melancholy individual’s ability both to create subjective temporal experience and, 
further, to narrate it. Romeo, however, is but one of many Shakespearean characters who 
narrate their experiences with melancholy; perhaps most notable is Othello.
Othello’s melancholy is evidenced in similar ways to Romeo’s, and likewise his 
melancholy also has specific temporal ramifications. Indeed, his melancholy shares 
many characteristics, as I will illustrate, with Leontes’ in The Winter’s Tale. As I 
explained at the outset of this project, what distinguishes Othello and Leontes and their 
respective emotional states is the issue of time. In , Iago’s ability to rouse
Othello’s jealousy occurs through a verbal manipulation that unfolds in time. Frederick 
Turner, following J.I.M. Stewart, has indicated that Iago brings about Othello’s jealousy 
in large part by supplanting the hero’s romantic time-sense with his own manic and 
persistent one {Shakespeare and the Nature o f  Time 114-15). Leontes, however, needs no 
one to goad his jealousy into being; as Harold Bloom indicates, he is his own Iago {The 
Invention o f  the Human 639). The diffuse expansiveness and longing associated with 
melancholy, and the posthaste tension associated with jealousy, are borne out by the 
respective temporalities of Othello and Iago at the play’s outset. While Turner’s 
indication of the opposing temporalities clearly helps to clarify how Iago impresses his 
mindset upon Othello’s, I suggest that the issue is somewhat more subtle than this
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formulation allows. As I have illustrated in Chapters 1 and 2, contemporary humoral 
treatises, such as those by Timothy Bright, Stephen Batman, and Robert Burton, indicate 
that a melancholic temperament altered by heat and turned adust will allow this 
individual the physiological logic to produce a humorally induced rage. This rage, I 
suggest, comes with a commensurate temporal-sense that allows the individual to pursue 
his jealousy to its “promised end” {King Lear 5.3.264), and such a trajectory unfolds in 
terms of the humoral body’s manifestation of illness.
In order to show the conflicting temporalities at work in Leontes’ case, I will first 
illustrate precisely how such time-senses clash in the character of Othello. As I have 
suggested, Othello is naturally of a melancholic disposition. Shakespeare ensures that the 
audience understands his melancholic temperament, because to the early modem English 
audience, such an individual, as we have seen from contemporary physiological texts, 
carries implicitly the ability to lapse into a frantic rage. Othello asks leave of 
Desdemona: “I do beseech thee, grant me this,/ To leave me but a little to m yself’ 
(3.3.84-5). Such a melancholic withdrawal into solitude ought to hearken us to Leontes’ 
similar withdrawal, or even to Hamlet’s. In addition Othello identifies himself and is 
identified by others as a ‘great man,’ one of the “great ones” (3.3.273), and as Juliana 
Schiesari points out, citing Aristotle, melancholy has been the associated with great men 
for thousands of years {The Gendering o f  Melancholy 6-7). For the early modem English 
audience, then, Othello’s request for time alone is part and parcel of a melancholic 
psychology.
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Further, Othello is epileptic, and as Klibansky, et al. illustrate in Saturn and 
Melancholy, in humoral medicine epilepsy was known as a melancholic disease, 
indicated by “symptoms of mental change, raging from fear, misanthropy, and 
depression, to madness in its most frightful forms” (14). When Othello falls into his 
epileptic fit, Iago notes that “he foams at mouth and by and by/ Breaks out to savage 
madness” (4.1.54-55). Othello’s melancholy is easily transformed, however, by Iago, 
whose goading comes not simply out of a musical untuning (Turner 116), but out of a 
metaphorical application of heat. Iago suggests that
Dangerous conceits are in their natures poisons,
Which at the first are scarce found to distaste,
But with a little act upon the blood 
Bum like the mines of sulphur. (3.3.326-29)
With this application of heat “upon the blood,” Iago has constructed a formulation in 
which Othello’s time sense has a physiological basis for psychological transformation, 
because in the humoral body both are one and the same (Paster 71). Shortly, Iago can 
greet Othello with the words “I see, sir, you are eaten up with passion” (3.3.390). And, 
true to form, Othello frames this “passion” in humoral terms:
Arise, black vengeance, from the hollow hell!
Yield up, O love, thy crown and hearted throne 
To tyrranous hate! Swell, bosom, with thy fraught 
For ‘tis of aspics’ tongues! . . .
O blood, blood, blood! (3.3.446-50, 451)
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Othello’s natural melancholy thus becomes transformed into unnatural melancholy. His 
localizing of this transformation in his blood bears out how this black bile of melancholy 
overwhelms him. Further, next he narrates how he becomes consumed with the frantic 
and unswerving temporal-sense of jealousy: “Even so, my bloody thoughts, with violent 
pace,/ Shall nev’r look back” (3.3.457-58). With this change of pace, Iago’s work has 
been accomplished, the untuning is complete, and the natural melancholic humor has 
transformed utterly into one turned adust, or unnatural.
Frederick Turner has outlined very clearly in Shakespeare and the Nature o f Time 
that “Iago’s rhythm destroys Othello’s” (116). But in addition to being merely a portrait 
in conflicting temporalities, Othello is in fact actually a portrait in melancholy, as it 
relates to what I term this emotion’s bifurcated temporalities. Othello’s romantic 
temporal-sense creates in him a melancholic desire that wishes time itself could simply 
stand still at 2.1.187ff. He becomes a character, however, who, when properly “tun’d” 
(2.1.199) by Iago, will not only see things differently, but will be consumed with a 
temporal-sense that insists on an ineluctably violent revenge. Iago brings this 
transformation about through discussion, through verbal manipulation, but this discussion 
is abetted physiologically by Othello’s melancholic disposition.
Othello truly ought to be called Iago. It is Iago’s jealousy that moves this play, 
and it is the jealousy Iago instills in Othello that brings about Othello’s downfall. As 
Iago tells us, his “cause is hearted” (1.3.166), meaning that his desire is rooted deeply in 
his passions. When Iago tells Roderigo that he needs to work on his “patience,” in 
waiting to woo Desdemona, he lies to him; that “wit depends on dilatory time” (3.1.372)
79
is merely a verbal sop thrown to him. Indeed, immediately thereafter, Iago insists to the 
audience that he himself ought
Dull not device by coldness and delay. (3.3.388)
This phrase is important for a number of reasons. The emphasis on temperature is 
important, because as I have pointed out, the jealous are of a hot bodily and humoral 
constitution. In maintaining the significance of the heat he requires to bring about 
Othello’s jealousy, Iago speaks physiological truth. But Iago’s equation of cold 
temperature with delay highlights that these two attributes are implicitly associated with 
natural melancholy. His avoidance of “coldness and delay” illustrates the temporal 
ramifications that Iago’s task in the play, as a jealous instigator, necessitates. Jealousy, it 
is clear, requires both the heat and immediacy that append to this domineering emotion.
Iago is inherently jealous and suspicious, which we learn because he tells us in 
soliloquy. He fears that Othello has “twixt” his “sheets” “done” his “office,” and insists: 
“I know not i f  t be true,/ But I, for mere suspicion in that kind,/ Will do as if  for surety”
(1.3.387-90). On the basis of this “suspicion” he bases his entire enterprise in bringing 
down Othello; this suspicion alone suffices to give him cause to hate the Moor (1.3.386). 
But Iago outlines the lengths to which his suspicion takes him elsewhere as well. In a 
remarkable passage, Iago explains to Othello that his suspicion is always aroused and that 
he cannot be trusted:
I do beseech you,
Though I perchance am vicious in my guess 
(As I confess it is my nature’s plague
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To spy into abuses, and oft my jealousy 
Shapes faults that are not), that your wisdom then,
From one that so imperfectly conjects,
Would take no notice, nor build yourself a trouble
Out of his scattering and unsure observance. (3.3.146-151)
Iago, therefore, speaks with a hideous truthfullness when he tells Othello: “Beware . . .  
jealousy” (3.3.165), for this emotion is precisely what Iago represents. The world Iago 
inhabits is, in the modem term, paranoid, and one consumed with the cuckoldry anxiety 
that Mark Breitenberg suggests defines the early modem Englishman. I suggest, 
however, that by laying emphasis on the humoral trajectory of melancholy, we can clarify 
the roles that temporalities play in effecting this trajectory.
This relationship between Othello and Iago therefore represents the bifurcated 
temporalities associated with melancholy, and their movement in time toward what is in 
fact not a synthesis, but a complete movement into Iago’s temporal-sense. Othello’s wish 
early in the play, that time itself could come to a stop in order to preserve his “joy” 
(2.1.97), serves as a temporal hallmark of melancholic psychology: “If it were now to 
die,/ ‘Twere now to be most happy . . .” (2.1.189-90). This desire resonates very clearly 
with Leontes’ desire in The Winter’s Tale, in which he, too, seeks to preserve an idealized 
moment indefinitely. But Iago’s jealousy stands in opposition to Othello’s desire, and 
inherent to Iago’s character comes Iago’s temporal identity: “Even now, now, very now” 
(1.1.88) comes to serve as a temporal hallmark of Iago’s jealous psychology. In The 
Comic Matrix o f  Shakespeare ’sTragedies, Susan Snyder notes that “Time-urgency,
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cause and effect, inevitability, are all versions of singleness; and behind them all is the 
single inescapable end to each life” (52). Singleness here means singleness of path, and 
thus once his thoughts are bent by Iago toward violence, Othello’s task is singular and 
unavoidable.
I have illustrated in Chapters 1 and 2 that Leontes’ narcissistic grieving for 
himself within the context of a past time manifests itself as a clear indication of his 
melancholy. Leontes’ physiological shift by means of humoral heat carries with it 
temporal ramifications that are discemable as an inward expression of what in Othello is 
the outward, and consequently more readily apparent, temporal-senses that are vying for 
power, represented by the characters of Othello and Iago. Leontes’ derangement may 
thus be understood as a fundamentally temporal derangement, in which his nostalgic 
desire for a past time lapses into a pathological desire to control time itself. This 
trajectory mirrors the trajectory of Othello, but with difference; in The Winter’s Tale, the 
untuning is brought on by Leontes alone.
Further, as a romance, The Winter’s Tale does not terminate with the closed and 
tragic ending of Othello. With the tragi-comic death of Antigonus by a bear, the 
desertion and retrieval of the infant Perdita, and the explanatory words of Time Himself, 
the audience is offered what appears to be an entirely different world in the latter half of 
the play. This is an option not offered in Othello. Where Shakespearean tragedy “moves 
toward the inevitable, [toward a] chain of causality that denies or renders irrelevant all 
alternatives but one” (Snyder 41), Shakespearean romances, as Kastan reminds us, are 
nevertheless typified by how closely their vision comes to the tragic:
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The key to the romance vision is the perspective that refuses to see tragic 
action as a fully realized whole. The field of vision is extended so that 
tragedy is recognized merely as a component of a more comprehensive 
action that moves beyond, and through, suffering to clarity and harmony. 
(131)
Such localization of tragic actions and activities within the romances, within 
Winter ’sTale in particular, insists that the tragedies differ from the romances by degree
and, quite literally, by where we stand. Kastan insists that “The gift of the romances is, 
then, their vision— but this means not merely what they see, but also how they see” (143 
emphasis his). In the next section I will illustrate how Shakespeare manifests Leontes’ 
temporal-sense as a subjective expression of his passions.
Time’s role in the play is a curious one. Shakespeare’s source for The Winter’s 
Tale, Greene’s Pandosto, contains the subtitle The Triumph o f  Time, and The Winter’s 
Tale concerns itself mainly with time in two of its forms. Time serves as tempus edax 
rerum in the first three Acts of the play, as time the devourer. In this view, time is 
manifestly linear and ineluctable. Its progressive nature is readily apparent in this part of 
the play, most explicitly in Leontes’ madness, in his search for a temporal regression that 
simply cannot be. The second view of time— that of time as the revealer, or creator— is 
central to our understanding of the play’s sixteen year-gap (Ewbank 99). Here time 
serves a function of “healing and restoring,” or “regeneration” (110). In Act Five, then, 
Leontes’words of greeting to Florizel and Perdita are not laughable, as they would have
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been in the first half of the play: “Welcome hither,/ As is the spring to th’ earth” (5.1.151- 
52). We are clearly in an altogether different world than in the previous depths of winter 
and the terror that had thundered through Leontes’ psyche. Inga-Stina Ewbank notes that 
this inclusion of the term “spring” echoes nicely the pastoral scenes of Act Four, and 
therefore “hint” at the “possibility” of reconciliation in the relationships of the characters 
in the play (110). The Lost One’s reappearence, Perdita’s return, points toward a 
mythical, cyclical framework from which to make sense of the environment for this 
reconciliation. But this pat theory of time’s significance Winter’s Tale surely limits 
far too greatly its significance to the play. Michael Bristol’s theory regarding time in the 
play, introduced in Chapter 1 of this thesis, suggests that the Bakhtinian concept of 
chronotopic derangement serves as a more productive manner in which to investigate 
time in The Winter ’s T a l e .
In “Social Time in The Winter’s TaleMichael Bristol suggests that the 
Bakhtinian concept of spatio-temporal derangement and its resultant anachronism serve 
as the most productive groundwork with which to investigate the play. Bristol’s 
argument hinges on the premise that what spurs Leontes’ derangement is his shattering of 
the “ethos of gift, hospitality and expenditure” (158). Bristol argues that Leontes’ issues 
concerning his masculinity are snugly bound in the social temporality of the play itself, 
within the exchange economy of Yuletide handsels, of gift-giving, and of proper 
courtesy: the same social world we encounter in a separate context in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight. Bristol forgoes the pursuit of what it is that causes Leontes’ derangement, 
centering instead on when it is that this derangement occurs.
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In The Gift, comparative anthropologist Marcel Mauss shows through 
comparative analysis the danger that coheres implicitly within gift-giving practices. The 
essence of gift-giving, of potlatch, he insists, is the “obligation to repay” (40). Indeed,
In the distinctive sphere of our social life we can never remain at rest. We 
must always return more than we receive; the return is always bigger and 
more costly. (43)
Noting the quickness with which Leontes’ jealousy issues from him “full blown” ( 
time Shakespeare 160), Bristol suggests that within the context of the midwinter gift 
economy, “Leontes’ jealousy is motivated by a barely conscious fantasy in which he 
gives his wife to Polixenes for his sexual enjoyment to intensify the social bond between 
the two men” (159). Significantly, Bristol argues that “Leontes then disavows this 
perverse and forbidden wish by ascribing it to Polixenes and Hermione” (159). This 
interpretation is an inversion of J.I.M. Stewart’s psychoanalytic view regarding Leontes’ 
jealousy as one focused on Polixenes, but channeled onto Hermione. In this scenario, 
Leontes’ formulation would stand as “I do not love him; she does” (30-39). While I find 
Stewart’s view largely unsupported by the text of the play, Bristol’s emphasis on the role 
the midwinter economy plays in the formation of Leontes’ madness is central, I believe, 
to making sense of this derangement.
As I suggested in Chapter 1, Leontes’ desire to prove difference between himself 
and Polixenes culminates in the transference of his kingly, virile ego and all that it 
entails— kingdom, wife and children— onto the void which Polixenes had both verbally 
and metaphorically created in the text of the play. Polixenes’ repeated insistence in 1.2
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that he has become nothing is maintained by his association with the term “void,” or 
“cipher.” By ascribing to Polixenes all, however, it is Leontes who is consequently left 
with nothing. Thus even Leontes’ melancholy humor becomes an issue. Leontes’ desire 
to prove difference fires even his melancholy, and, thus, in a fit of tremor cordis, or 
hysterica passio, or of melancholy madness, or of cardiaca passio, all medically 
synonymous, his melancholy humor becomes adust, and sends its deadly vapors to his 
brain. Leontes’ attempt to outdistance Polixenes, to prove difference between himself 
and his twin, in the meantime proves indeed to be possible in humoral terms, but with 
terrible and tragic results. The ennabling function of cuckoldry anxiety, too, as 
Breitenberg has identified it, allows Leontes to rage against Hermione and thereby to 
reaffirm his own lost sense of masculinity.
Bristol’s analysis of how time works in The Winter’s Tale leads him to pursue M. 
M. Bakhtin’s theory on the kinds of artistic time laid out in his essay Forms o f Time and 
o f the Chronotope in the Novel. In addition to the period of the year in which the first 
three Acts of The Winter’s Tale is set, during what Bristol identifies as Yuletide time, and 
its economy based on gift and exchange, Bristol suggests that the form of time in the play 
adheres closely to what Bakhtin identifies as “adventure time.” This temporality, he 
suggests, is characterized by rapid shifts in temporal placement and of locally concretized 
periods of time ( Big-time Shakespeare 149). The locally concretized period of Yuletide
time in The Winter ’sTale, for example, yields to an expansive, sixteen year Lenten 
period for Leontes to atone for his rage. Such scope in the temporal realm recalls Murray 
Schwartz’s concept that
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In the world of romance and in dreams, space and time are 
interchangeable categories. (“Leontes’ Jealousy” 255)
Schwartz shows that this transposable nature of time and space is manifested in the play 
by the image early in the play of the two kings who have perpetually been “[shaking] 
hands, as over a vast” (1.1.30). Schwarz relates this expanse of space with the sixteen- 
year temporal gap (255) at the heart of the play. The locally concretized midwinter 
portrait of Leontes’ derangement, therefore, seemingly ought to be read as only a 
temporary and localized derangement brought on ultimately by the season. I will argue 
below that such a resolution does not appear to be the case in Winter’s Tale.
Bristol’s reading of the end of The Winter’s Tale is manifestly ambivalent. He 
disparages the common reading of the play’s end as a reconciliation:
What these religious interpretations seem to say is that Hermione forgives 
Leontes ‘objectively.’ But there is no attempt to describe this forgiveness 
as something achieved or developed in the fullness of time, for the very 
good reason that no such temporally lived process is manifested in the 
play’s organization. In fact, a conscientious effort has been made to 
exclude the experience of duration as lived by Hermione in the ‘fullness of 
time.’ (173 emphasis his)
Bristol argues that Leontes’ derangement itself serves as what amounts to a strategic 
investment. Bristol suggests that Leontes had generated and enacted an investment 
strategy during the midwinter, spatio-temporal world of the gift economy. This 
investment eventually pays off through “fiduciaries in the profoundly altered spatio-
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temporal realities of a market economy” (173), in Acts Four and Five of the play. Here 
the gift-economy is transformed into “the time of agricultural labor and market 
exchange” (169). This shift to the market economy is evidenced by the wise financial 
work Perdita’s adoptive family puts to the gold left with her as a baby (169), by the 
“compters” required to prepare for the sheep-shearing festival (4.3.36), by Autolycus’ 
selling of ballads and baubles, as well as a scrupulous class delineation and social 
mobility. Consequently, “Leontes’ redemption is not brought about by grace and 
forgiveness, but is rather the result of his bold, risk-taking decisions combined with his 
patience and enormous capacity for deferral” (173). Bristol acknowledges that with 
Mamillius still dead at the play’s end, the payoff, the return in itself, is not by any means 
ideal. Regardless, Bristol’s suggestions cast a masterful light on the concept and 
significance of time in The Winter ’sTale, uniting economics with the chronotope in order 
to evince a reading which is far superior to previous criticism’s stale views of time’s 
worth in the play. That forgiveness and reconciliation are not achieved with any real 
solidity in the ending of the Winter ’sTale leads us to very important ground.
Leontes’ melancholic grieving at the loss of his idealized, pre-pubescent identity 
in the play— which, as I argued in Chapter 1, serves as the lost Edenic root of Leontes 
pathological melancholy— appears to be analogized by the sixteen year hiatus at the 
play’s center. Where Bristol suggests that it is Hermione who at the play’s end has a tale 
worthy of the telling (174), I suggest that Leontes bears investigation toward that end.
His botched maturation into manhood, and the resultant sixteen year lacuna in The 
Winter’s Tale, stands markedly juxtaposed to his daughter, Perdita’s development. Her
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name, the Lost One, and her maturation from infant to young adult, suggests Leontes’ 
own corresponding development into adulthood. But this solution is not really as neat as 
we might want to have it. I suggest that we look not for Leontes’ fully realized adult 
identity to emerge by the play’s end, but rather look to his magical ability to live in what 
emerges as a simultaneity of chronotopes. Leontes comes to inhabit a world of 
psychologically temporal concurrence: in the Bakhtinian sense of holiday and workaday 
time, and in the Freudian sense of a perpetual childhood folded onto a reluctant 
adulthood. In a technical sense, Leontes gets to have his cake and eat it too.
These conjoined chronotopes converge in Leontes through what is his static 
agelessness. This non-aging quality represents, in itself, a Bakhtinian parodic structuring 
that insistently refers to the camivalesque in the play. Bristol points out that in the real 
Jacobean world of 1610-11, when The Winter Tale was written and first performed, the 
carnival, as signified by the period of time between Christmas-tide and Shrove-tide, was 
limited to only one day: Shrove Tuesday (167). Because of an early Easter, the time 
between the festive Yuletide and Lenten seasons was given “only short shrift” (167). In 
other words, Bristol suggests that “there is no time for a transition . . .  between the typical 
transitions and social behaviors of Christmas-tide . . .  with its focus on expenditure, and 
those of Lenten-tide with its focus on abstinence, fasting, and repentance” (emphasis his 
167). Thus Bristol points to The Winter 'sTale as consequently possessing a lack of the 
carnival and of the camivalesque. Here I differ with Bristol. I believe that Leontes’ 
melancholy and the play’s sixteen year hiatus themselves serve as clear indications of
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Bakhtinian holiday time, of the characteristics typical of Bakhtin’s signification of the 
camivalesque.
In “Modem Parody and Bakhtin,” Linda Hutcheon abstracts Bakhtin’s discussion 
of the Medieval camivalesque into what she refers to as the “underlying principle of all 
discourse: the paradox of authorized transgression of norms” (99). This transgression 
must be understood as sanctioned by authority and therefore normalized into holiday time 
(99-100). Paulina’s scathing attacks against Leontes are clear indications of a sanctioned, 
or tolerated, inversion of norms, in which the workaday world itself is made void through 
the suspension of its laws. The full effect of the camivalesque, o f a sustained holiday 
time on the characters in the play, is clearly manifested in the beguiling relationship 
between Paulina and Leontes. Bakhtin remarks that the Fool has “the right to confuse, to 
tease . . .  to parody others while talking . .. not ‘to be oneself; the right to live a life in 
the chronotope . . .  [to] theatrical space . . .  to rip off masks . . .  [and] to rage at people 
with a primeval (almost cultic) rage” ( Forms o f Time . . . 163). Interestingly, in Act Four, 
Autolycus remarks “What a fool Honesty is!” (4.4.595). This exclamation points 
artlessly to Paulina’s function in the play.
One of Paulina’s chief capacities in The Winter’s Tale is to disparage Leontes in 
support of the honor of his wife, Queen Hermione. Paulina fights furiously and valiantly 
to effect this end, and without fear for her own life and safety, no matter how treasonous 
her words. When Leontes demands Antigonus control his wife as Paulina berates the 
King, she retorts: “He shall not rule me” (2.3.49), and thus she “enacts a form of misrule” 
Schalkwyk 256), coming to serve as a Bakhtinian Lady of Misrule. Next she takes issue
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with Leontes’s questioning of Hermione’s honesty, of her chastity, of her being a good 
Queen: “I say good Queen,/ And would by combat make her good, so were 1/ A man, the 
worst about you” (2.3.60-62). The service she renders here parodies, in the Bakhtinian 
sense, the role she is prescribed. She becomes the Fool, again in Bakhtin’s terms, who 
uses the truth caustically to effect her desired end. When Paulina delivers to Leontes his 
daughter, he calls her “A mankind witch!” (68), further noting the reversal of roles she 
has assumed in her very nature. She bellows to Leontes that he “betrays to slander” the 
signs of his virility, his “sacred honor” itself: his wife, son, and infant (2.3.85).
But the full power Paulina assumes in the inversion of her role with the King’s, in 
her assumption of the King’s power, is made fully manifest when she orders him not to 
remarry. “No more such wives,” he concedes, “therefore no wife” (5.1.56). Later, he 
repeats, “Fear thou no wife;/ I’ll have no wife, Paulina” (68-69). Finally, he place all 
power in her stead, vowing never to marry “but by [Paulina’s] free leave” (70). These 
examples show clearly the totality of the inversion of the power structures in the play, 
and therefore the deliberate evocation and suspension of holiday time, of the 
camivalesque, form the onset of Leontes’ derangement, in 1.2, right through to Act Five. 
David Schalkwyk points out that this suspension of the camivalesque in the play is 
maintained throughout Act Four, from the “camivalesque ‘marketplace’” is brought into 
the world of agricultural festival” (260). Schalkwyk identifies in Autolycus, Perdita, and 
the masked Polixenes, within the setting of Bohemia, a mirroring for the events that 
transpired in Sicilia in the first three Acts of the play (260-64). But clearly the 
camivalesque inversion of hierarchies must come to an end, Polixenes’ mask must come
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off, and that which brings about this end is once more the rage of a king consumed with 
concern over “fair issue,” with his own patrilineal descent (4.417-441).
By the end of The Winter’s Tale, Leontes’ dual chronotopes, as I have proposed, 
urge ambiguity on a grand scale. Where Bristol focuses on the symbolic economy at 
work within the limiting concept of a layered and conflicted spatio-temporality, I argue 
that Leontes’ derangement must be viewed not as a development on its own, but rather as 
a fundamental bifurcation. The split into two frames of being clarifies Leontes’ own 
disjunction. At the end of the play, there is little sense that Leontes has in any way 
matured from his state before he had lapsed into his jealous rage. Indeed, in Act Five, he 
clearly states that it is the “wrong he did himself’ (5.1.9) that he most repents, in leaving 
himself without an heir. While he had “bred his hopes” (5.1.12) out of Hermione, this 
ambivalent report in itself rings coldly. Leontes continues at the end of the play to view 
children for the light they cast back on their paternity: on greeting Florizel, he notes 
“Your mother was most true to wedlock, Prince,/ For she did print your royal father off,/ 
Conceiving you” (5.1.124-26). This hearkens back ominously to the pathological 
concerns Leontes had had at the outset of the play regarding his son Mamillius, and his 
paternity. Further, in “reading” Polixenes in his son, Florizel, Leontes constructs a way 
in which to view his double, and, by inference, another way in which to view both 
himself, as well as the son that he lost in Mamillius (1.2). Leontes has thus not lost his 
tendency to “read” the father in the child even after he is supposed to have learned his 
lesson on the danger of pursuing such a matter. It also enables him to see himself 
nostalgically as an idealized man of Florizel’s age.
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This tendency, however, is compounded by Leontes’ cyclical referencing at the 
end of the play to further specific events that had precipitated his derangement in the 
beginning. In 5.3, Leontes again views Polixenes and Hermione together, just as in 1.2. 
Leontes inauspiciously re-recalls his wooing of her, and thus, again, his fall from grace. 
Again he invokes the issue of shame, uttering “I am asham’d” (5.3.37). Although 
ostensibly repenting here the role he had played in her death, such words resound with 
the issue of impurity. The word “shame” in itself clearly refers us to the last time 
Leontes had felt this emotion in the presence of Polixenes and Hermione. Leontes 
continues, though, and relates, eerily enough, that his “evils [are] conjur’d to 
remembrance” (5.3.40). These are precisely the worrisome concerns toward purity that 
generated the tragedy of the first three Acts of the play in the first place.
The romance ending to The Winter’s Tale appears to offer a generic resolution 
that terminates with complete closure: Hermione is restored to life, Paulina is remarried, 
Perdita is found and is to be married to Florizel, and the Kings of Bohemia and Sicilia are 
reconciled. But this ending ought to be understood, rather, as an unsettled status quo, one 
brought about through Leontes’ continued feelings of “shame” and “remembrance.” 
Leontes’ failure to achieve catharsis, in tragic terms, suggests that the play’s resolution is 
in fact more problematic than has yet been suggested. I offer one way of reading this 
romance that draws attention to the very temporality that Shakespeare investigates in this 
play, and illustrates that this temporal-sense hinges largely on the Renaissance passion of 
melancholy.
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Melancholy and its close relative, jealousy, exist as emotions within temporally 
constructed and temporally identifiable worlds, and the indeterminacy of the ending of 
The Winter ’sTale hinges on the essential indeterminacy of the melancholy humor. The 
black bile of melancholy’s inherent ability to transform from a “natural” state to an 
“unnatural” indicates its radical instability, and this radical instability defined the 
melancholy humor as fundamentally dangerous and irrational to the Renaissance mind. 
While it could lead men to the height of intellectual and literary achievement, it also 
carried latently the ability to serve as cause for extraordinary violence. Stephen Orgel 
has noted that “Marriage is a dangerous condition in Shakespeare” (Impersonations 17), 
and the affective state of melancholy seems to have exacerbated that danger. Surely the 
virulently patriarchal world of early modem England, from which both Othello and The 
Winter ’sTale take their shape, was not a comfortable or ideal world for women by any 
means; but this world was similarly uncomfortable for men as well. Such a paradox 
underlies the pathologies investigated in this project. Leontes’ ambiguous and 
ambivalent portrait at the end of The Winter’s Tale illustrates not only the fundamental 
instability of the melancholy humor, but also the instability of all patriarchal systems. 
Melancholy’s bifurcated temporal-senses, as I have outlined them, in the end help to 
clarify this instability, and to locate the principle effect these passions have on 
Renaissance subjectivity.
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